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ABSTRACT
With the growing number of clean-slate redesigns of the Internet, the need for
a medium that enables all stakeholders to participate in the realization, evaluation,
and selection of these designs is increasing. We believe that the missing catalyst is
a meta network architecture that welcomes most, if not all, clean-state designs on a
level playing field, lowers deployment barriers, and leaves the final evaluation to the
broader community.
This thesis presents the eXpressive Internet (Meta) Architecture (XIA), itself a
clean-slate design, as well as Linux XIA, a native implementation of XIA in the Linux
kernel, as a candidate. As a meta network architecture, XIA is highly flexible, leav-
ing stakeholders to choose an expressive set of network principals to instantiate a
given network architecture within the XIA framework. Central to XIA is its novel,
non-linear network addressing format, from which derive key architectural features
such as evolvability, intrinsically secure identifiers, and a low degree of principal iso-
lation. XIP, the network layer protocol of XIA, forwards packets by navigating these
structured addresses and delegating the decision-making and packet processing to ap-
vii
propriate principals, accordingly. Taken together, these mechanisms work in tandem
to support a broad spectrum of interoperable principals.
We demonstrate how to port four distinct and unrelated network architectures
onto Linux XIA, none of which were designed for interoperability with this plat-
form. We then show that, notwithstanding this flexibility, Linux XIA’s forwarding
performance remains comparable to that of the more mature legacy TCP/IP stack
implementation. Moreover, the ported architectures, namely IP, Serval (Nordstro¨m
et al., 2012), NDN (Jacobson et al., 2009), and ANTS (Wetherall, 1999), empower
us to present a deployment plan for XIA, to explore design variations of the ported
architectures that were impossible in their original form due to the requirement of
self-sufficiency that a standalone network architecture bears, and to substantiate the
claim that XIA readily supports and enables network evolution. Our work highlights
the benefits of specializing network designs that XIA affords, and comprises instruc-
tive examples for the network researcher interested in design and implementation for
future interoperability.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
How are we, the research community, going to find the next Internet architecture?
The research community is split into two groups, purists and pluralists, when it
comes to answering this question (Anderson et al., 2005; Roscoe, 2006). With the
benefit of hindsight, we can summarize those answers as follows: purists have been
busy designing customized network architectures for the specific future scenarios that
they each envision, whereas pluralists have focused on designs that both embrace the
diversity of architectures and future scenarios in the purists’ visions, as well as those
yet unforeseen. We are pluralists.
The search for future Internet architectures is motivated by deficiencies of the
current Internet. Many proposals have been put forward, but little has been done
to broadly evaluate and compare these proposals, which in turn has split the efforts
of the research community. We believe that a catalyst to find the next Internet
architecture is missing, and that once the community comes to consensus to identify
what the next Internet architecture should be, we would promptly work together to
realize it.
In this work, we advocate eXpressive Internet (Meta) Architecture (XIA) (Anand
et al., 2011a; Anand et al., 2011b; Han et al., 2012), a new kind of meta architecture
that nurtures coexistence of clean-slate designs, lets stakeholders experiment with
and choose the designs that best suit their needs. The distinctive feature of XIA over
2previous meta architectures is that XIA enables coexistence of designs through the use
of so-called principals, each of which are afforded the opportunity to specialize. These
specialized principals enable designers to focus on the key functionality they want
to materialize, and promotes composition or reuse of these functionalities by other
supported principals. It is this distinctive feature of XIA that, through architectural
pluralism, lets stakeholders experiment with and choose the designs that best suit
their needs.
The rest of the introduction is organized as follows:
• First, we provide unifying terminology and definitions. The community lacks a
consistent vocabulary for enabling architectural comparisons (or even an agreed-
upon definition of network architecture itself). Therefore, we begin by present-
ing and formally defining our unifying terms: network factors, network archi-
tecture, and meta architectures in the next section.
• We argue for the need for meta architectures in Section 1.2. The presented
discussion centers on a broad motivation of meta architectures. Although it
encompasses some of the contexts that have motivated meta architectures in
previous works, it does not try to summarize all of them.
• Section 1.3 succinctly introduces XIA. This short presentation gives readers a
quick overview of our design deep enough to understand our contributions, and
most of the other chapters.
• We introduce a taxonomy of meta architectures in Section 1.4 that classifies
meta architectures documented in the literature, and contextualizes our work.
• Our thesis statement as well as a description of the approach we have employed
to demonstrate our statement is in Section 1.5.
3• Contributions other than those our thesis statement covers are in Section 1.6.
• Section 1.7 describes the organization of the remaining chapters.
1.1 Definitions
In order to clarify the exposition of our work, we have identified the need of crafting
definitions for the following terms: network factor, architecture, and meta archi-
tecture. We introduce these terms one by one, each followed by examples, provide
motivation for the structure of the definition, and an explanation of the vocabulary
used in the definition. The section concludes with a justification for not reusing
definitions found elsewhere.
The definitions in this section only cover data plane elements. Therefore, control
plane elements such as routing protocols are not considered. We adopt Shenker’s
definitions for data and control planes (Shenker, 2013):
Data plane: process packets with local forwarding state.
Control plane: compute the forwarding state of the data plane.
Our first definition is factors:
A network factor is a data plane component that specifies abstractions, data for-
mats, procedures, protocols, and at least one class of identifiers that, together,
enable the instantiation of functional network configurations of data processors.
We can see that IP, TCP and UDP are all examples of factors. Although a factor
is defined through many items, the essential one is furnishing a class of identifiers.
IP fulfills this requirement with its IP addresses, while the identifiers TCP and UDP
define are their port numbers. While this statement may seem obvious, it will gain
contrast when we introduce XIP in Section 1.3, XIA’s network layer protocol, which
4does not define identifiers of its own, and thus is not a factor. Nevertheless, each of
XIA’s core principals are examples of a network factor.
The definition of network factor does not impose any size restrictions, reflecting
the reality that factor designers, as well as different meta architectures, may optimize
for different utilities, and may therefore view any such restrictions as arbitrary. This
degree of freedom is expressed in the definition through the lack of quantifiers before
every element that a factor defines except its classes of identifiers. An important side-
effect of this flexibility in the definition is what we call factor multiplicity, that is,
combining a fixed number of factors leads to a single factor, analogous to how numeric
expressions are defined. Therefore, TCP/IP, that is TCP, UDP, and IP combined, is
a factor.
Factor multiplicity copes with the fact that factors are often combined. The
examples of this fact can be sophisticated, and may be out of reach of first-time
readers. For example, in ANTS, if a coder wants to have the functionality of two
or more factors in a single factor, she has to literally combine the mobile code that
defines those factors, due to the degree of factor isolation in ANTS (Section 1.4);
ANTS is discussed in Sections 1.4 and 4.4. As another example, factors U4ID, I4ID,
and X4ID (Section 4.1) could be merged into a single factor if a network architect
favors this approach. Finally, the Serval factor (Section 4.2) defines two classes of
identifiers that are tightly intertwined.
With factors defined, we can now define architectures:
A network architecture is a self-sufficient factor.
Self-sufficiency is a test. The authors of an architecture describe what the archi-
tecture is good for, and their design is self-sufficient if they can describe any working
aspect of the data plane of their design without resorting to components external to
the design, other than a control plane that populates forwarding state and the hard-
5ware necessary to implement the architecture. Self-sufficiency is analogous to proving
that a program terminates for the inputs that their designers claim it would. Later,
Section 6.2 presents a more advanced view of factors that allows us to fold the hard-
ware necessary to implement an architecture into a factor, leaving only the control
plane as an external component. It is worth pointing out that self-sufficiency is an
implicit assumption in the literature on network architecture, and is well illustrated
by the title and goal of Section 3 of Omega’s design (Raghavan et al., 2012a) that
reads as “Making Omega Sufficient”.
Continuing our earlier examples, IP accomplishes its existential goal of sending
packets from a host to another on its own, that is, IP is a self-sufficient factor;
therefore, IP is an architecture. Given that TCP/IP is a factor, as established before,
and IP is self-sufficient, TCP/IP is an architecture as well. The same is not true for
TCP and UDP, which depend either upon IP, or upon an alternative internetwork
factor, to function.
Thanks to factor multiplicity, the definition of architecture does not have to ex-
plicitly make mention of multiple factors. Having multiplicity in the definition of
architectures is intuitively appealing, but having multiplicity in both definitions leads
to ambiguous interpretations. For examples, TCP/IP would be an architecture either
following the description above, or because the set of factors it includes would be an
architecture as well. Finally, the choice of having multiplicity at the factor instead
of at the architecture definition is due the prevalence of factor multiplicity as already
discussed.
We define meta architectures directly over factors instead of over architectures:
A meta network architecture is a framework that harmonizes a broad spectrum
of factors within its framework without imposing any static dependencies among
factors.
6The demand for supporting a broad spectrum of factors is meant to match the
intuition that designs that support a limited amount of diversity are insufficiently
general to warrant the meta architecture designation. Whereas the demand for not
imposing static dependencies, or dependencies that arise in the design phase, among
factors captures the notion that network evolution not only entails the ability to add
new factors to a meta architecture, but also to drop deprecated factors. It is worth
pointing out that our definition of meta architecture does not forbid runtime depen-
dencies among factors (a technique we support and whose benefits we articulate later).
Viewing them in a different way, static dependencies are imposed on stakeholders by
designers, whereas runtime dependencies are derived from stakeholders’ choices.
A framework that defines a meta architecture necessarily describes how factors are
embedded in the framework. Thanks to this description, each supported factor has the
same capabilities as any other factor in the framework. This description is analogous
to how a country constitution folds states in its framework. This description is what
harmonizes, that is, makes uniform, the interfaces that factors have to fulfill in order
to be supported. Fulfilling these interfaces is the essential requirement for mapping
factors onto a meta architecture. XIA’s framework for harmonizing factors is defined
by the XIP protocol, which is outlined in Section 1.3. While Section 1.4 presents
other meta architectures, it also gives an overview of how the supported factors are
folded into the framework of those meta architectures.
While designing and implementing a network architecture, it is easy to include
an arbitrary dependency between factors. Architectural designers and coders find
it alluring because it makes designs more concrete and intelligible earlier, and re-
duces initial coding effort. We define a static dependency among factors to be present
whenever removing one factor from the set of deployed factors requires the removal
of additional factors because they have to be recoded in order to work again. For
7example, if IP were dropped from TCP/IP, TCP and UDP would need to be re-
coded to work with another internetwork factor. Therefore, despite its support for
many applications, TCP/IP cannot be considered a meta architecture because all
supported factors statically depend on IP. Section 1.4 presents positive examples of
meta architectures.
Three additional observations are warranted here. First, if a surviving factor has
its functionality reduced due to the new set of deployed factors in which the factor
finds itself, it does not characterize a static dependency. For example, consider the last
internetwork factor that is removed from a deployed set that also includes the Serval
factor (Section 4.2). Serval will no longer be able to establish connections between
hosts, but it will still be able to establish connections whose endpoints reside within
the same host. Second, network operators may deploy a meta architecture in such a
way that they force runtime dependency among factors. Since these dependencies are
derived from choices of stakeholders of the network, we do not view them as static
dependencies, but rather as runtime dependencies. Finally, our third observation is
that the control plane may need to be retooled to adapt to the change of the deployed
set. As stated above, our definitions do not cover the control plane.
Our definitions of architectures and meta architectures are related through the
factor definition. Factors are defined somewhat more abstractly than architectures.
Once self-sufficiency is given up, the size and scope of factors become less clear. This
property of the definition is desirable since it captures the intuitions that are present in
other works. It is intuitively tempting to define meta architectures over architectures
instead of over factors. In fact, Section 1.4 shows that yielding to this temptation has
been the norm. The reason for relying on factors to define meta architectures is to
reflect that factors, when allowed, can specialize, and increase their chance of being
reused in contexts others than those that motivated their conception. In other words,
8it reflects that promoting interoperability among factors is attainable. Factor LPM,
introduced in Section 4.1 and reused in Section 4.2, materializes this point.
Readers may benefit from an analogy between our definitions and, perhaps more
familiar, electric circuits. Factors are equivalent to electronic components; they can do
as little as a resistor1, or as much as an integrated circuit, which can amalgamate huge
numbers of other electronic components, or somewhere in between those two extremes.
Building upon this analogy, an architecture is a combination of a finite number of
electronic components that together does something, for example: TVs, radios, and
network switches. While we do not have a clear element in electronics to represent a
meta architecture, the map proposed here highlights that defining meta architectures
directly over electronic components, instead of over a fully functional combination of
them, enables components being shared by the whole meta architecture.
To conclude, why did we not use definitions already available in the literature for
factors, architectures, and meta architectures? We have not come across a formal def-
inition equivalent to ours for factors, and the literature on meta architectures does not
offer a broad definition that encompasses works of multiple authors as our definition
of meta architecture does. We believe that the lack of a meta architecture definition
in the literature explains why prior work has not contrasted their designs directly
against other meta architectures instead of focusing on pointwise comparisons.
It may surprise some researchers that although the term architecture has long
and extensively been used by the network community, few have tried to pin it down.
Roscoe (Roscoe, 2006, Section 3) captures well this pattern in the literature: “I can’t
say what an architecture is, but I know it when I see it”. It is not to say that we are
the first to try to define architectures, Raghavan et al. has proposed the following
definition (Raghavan et al., 2012b, Section 1):
1An electric component that controls current by providing resistance to the flow of electrons that
crosses it.
9Architecture: This refers to the current IP protocol or, more generally, any globally
agreed upon convention that dictates how packets are handled.
While this definition explicitly agrees with ours that IP is an architecture, it places a
high toll on new architectures since they have to become broadly understood before
becoming an architecture. An online search for the string “define network architec-
ture” lists a number of definitions. While we have found that these definitions are
often reasonable, we have not found a definition that allowed us to relate an architec-
ture and a meta architecture, to say when a network design becomes an architecture,
or identify a single property that is common to all architectures. For example, a corol-
lary from our definitions is that an architecture defines at least a class of identifiers.
Although this section extensively explains our definitions, we recognize that more
examples and experience with them is required to master them. Many sections
throughout this dissertation return to and elaborate more examples of these defi-
nitions. Finally, we expect that as other researchers seek to pick up these definitions,
they will help to refine them further.
1.2 The need for a meta network architecture
An increasingly frequently debated question is whether or not TCP/IP has entered
the end of its life cycle. There is no definitive answer to this question, and both sides
of the argument have accumulated evidence to support their position. This section
visits oft-cited evidence that TCP/IP is failing to keep up with demand, as well as
arguments to dismiss this evidence, and presents a pragmatic view that stands aside
of this discussion. This pragmatic view points out that the search for a TCP/IP
replacement provides benefits independently of which side of the argument is right.
The contrarians, those who believe that TCP/IP is rapidly approaching the end
of its life cycle, point to the growing pressure on aspects that the original design of
10
TCP/IP does not address, and has not evolved to do so. Among those aspects, the
three most often cited are (1) limited node mobility, (2) lack of support for diversity
at the network layer such as content routing, and (3) insufficient security. In the
last year, a number of companies have reported evidence that the pressure on these
aspects are growing: (1) the world surpassed a 1 billion smartphones in use (Koetsier,
2013; Hornyak, 2014), (2) static content takes more than half of all downstream traffic
during peak periods (Sandvine, 2013), and (3) denial of service (DoS) attacks have
threatened to disrupt the Internet (Prince, 2013).
The conservatives, those who believe that the Internet has not entered the end of
its life cycle, point that incremental evolution has been the norm since the early days
in 1970s, and argue that incremental evolution is the way to go (Rexford and Dovrolis,
2010). Mark Handley (Handley, 2006, Section 2.1) summarizes the incremental evolu-
tion that has kept the Internet growing, such as the development of DNS, congestion
control, and Classless Inter-Domain Routing. Conservatives dismiss the evidence of
the contrarians to point out that not only is the Internet properly working and still
growing, but the pressure on weak aspects of the Internet are being worked out: (1)
once deployed, Multipath TCP (Ford et al., 2011) holds the promise of addressing
most of the mobility issue, (2) Content Delivery Networks are expected to handle 51%
of all Internet traffic in 2017, up from 34% in 2012 (Cisco, 2013); moreover, an in-
crementally deployable version of Information-Centric Networking (ICN) has already
been proposed (Fayazbakhsh et al., 2013), and (3) there already exist companies that
provide DoS protection (CloudFlare, Inc., 2014; Arbor Networks, Inc., 2014; VeriSign,
Inc., 2014).
Independently from when or whether TCP/IP will be replaced, moderates recog-
nize that there are proposed solutions for (1) node mobility (Nordstro¨m et al., 2012),
(2) an alternative network layer for ICN (Jokela et al., 2009), and (3) new defenses in
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the literature (Yang et al., 2005) that have not been fully explored due to the lack of
of a proper medium to prove their value. In addition, given the already large and still
growing dependence of the world upon the Internet, it would be prudent to identify
a suitable replacement for TCP/IP in a timely fashion, so as to avoid disruption that
may take place if the search for this replacement is unfinished when demand becomes
urgent. Finally, in case an opportunity for replacing TCP/IP is an elusive dream,
valuable findings could nevertheless be back-ported onto the existing architecture.
The growing number of clean-slate redesigns of the Internet reflects the sensible
effort of the network community to address the need of timely finding successors to
TCP/IP. However, this effort lacks a medium to bring all stakeholders to participate
in the realization, evaluation, and selection of future Internet architectures. On the
one hand, most existing clean-slate designs are siloed and elevate a few network use
cases above others, which fails to facilitate a collaborative environment for the myr-
iad of Internet stakeholders, whose goals are not generally aligned. Further evidence
comes from the fact that there are few, if any, examples of cross-pollination of run-
ning code across clean-slate proposals. On the other hand, and in the community’s
defense, designers have justifiably found it difficult to bring a new design into fruition,
demonstrate its merits, and have the community at large experiment with it, due to
the lack of a suitable comparative evaluation platform on which to do so.
Moreover, the current push toward cloud computing has centralized many servers
into massive datacenters, which in turn creates opportunities to explore architectures
that improve the return on investment made by datacenter operators. The networks
of these datacenters are built from, to some degree, programmable devices, thanks to
the rise of merchant silicon2. A meta architecture reduces the risk of managing these
datacenters, because it does not bind datacenter operators to a single architecture,
2 Merchant silicon are “off the shelf” chips that facilitate the implementation of networking
devices such as switches and routers.
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or to a small set of architectures that may turn out to be losers in the long run.
We believe that the missing catalyst to bring the exploration of future Internet
architectures into fruition is a meta network architecture. In fact, part of the research
community has already identified this need given the meta architectures that have
been explored (Section 1.4). In the thesis, we advocate a new variety of meta archi-
tecture that promotes interoperability among ported factors to bring the community
at large to create the next Internet architecture. The next sections present XIA,
our meta architecture, and a taxonomy of meta architectures that provides a broad
comparison of meta architectures, including XIA.
1.3 Overview of XIA
XIA’s central goal is an evolvable and secure Internet architecture. By evolvable,
XIA means having an explicit, well-defined, incremental path to introduce changes
to its network layer, which is called the eXpressive Internet Protocol (XIP). These
changes are introduced and removed in units; each of these units is called an XIA
principal. We will show that XIA principals are examples of our more general term,
factors. By secure, XIA means providing the capabilities to deliver security guar-
antees to applications. XIA’s main vehicles to carry evolution and enable security
guarantees are, its expressive network addresses and the intrinsic security found at
its network identifiers, respectively. The remainder of this section presents the key
concepts of XIA’s design, puts these concepts together to form sample addresses, and
concludes with why XIA with an empty set of principals is a meta architecture, but
not an architecture, according to our definitions. The content here serves as a quick
introduction to XIA, a more complete description is provided in Chapter 2.
In order for XIA principals to influence the forwarding mechanism of XIP, they
must introduce their own identifiers. These identifiers are called eXpressive IDentifiers
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(XIDs), and name any object or concept that principals define. Each XID is the
pairing of a principal type (32 bits) and a name or ID (160 bits). Example of principals
and corresponding XIDs are the Autonomous Domain (AD) principal, which names
XIA networks, the Host (HID) principal, which names any machine (virtual or not)
with an XIA stack, and the Content (CID) principal, which names immutable content.
Intrinsic security cryptographically links each XID’s name to some property. For
example, AD XIDs are the hash of public keys of the networks they name, HID XIDs
are the hash of public keys of the machines they name, and CID XIDs are the hash of
the contents of the file they name. When a network delivers to an application the file
corresponding to the requested XID CID1, the application can verify that it received
the correct file by hashing the content of the file and comparing the hash against
the content name CID1. The hash of a public key allows an application to obtain
the corresponding public key from any source, trusted or not, verify that it is the
correct public key, and from there, bootstrap a secure communication to the entity
bound to that public key. While it is desirable to have intrinsic security for all XIDs,
this is not attainable because some principals do not have security properties to offer
on their XIDs; see Section 4.1 for examples. Nevertheless, principal designers are
strongly encouraged to imbue their principals’ XIDs with intrinsic security wherever
it is possible.
XIP addresses amalgamate principals’ behaviors to accomplish application-level
intents, and are represented as single-component, single-source, single-sink directed
acyclic graphs (DAGs) of XIDs. The ultimate intent of a packet is expressed in the
XID of the sink node of the destination address. The entry node of an address,
represented by a dot (•), has the sole purpose of pointing to where the navigation
of the DAG begins, and thus the simplest, nonempty XIP address is • → XID1.
While destination addresses must be nonempty, source addresses can be empty; see
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Section 4.3 for an example. All other (internal) nodes of an address represent XIDs,
and each node is associated with between one and four strictly prioritized outgoing
edges; four being the maximum fanout supported in XIP addresses.
Routers are required to forward packets according to the intent expressed in each
DAG destination address. Therefore, a valid set of packet forwarding decisions at
routers must correspond to a successful traversal of the DAG from entry node to sink
to achieve the final intent. How is this accomplished? First, the XIP header stores
the DAG as a collection of nodes and their prioritized edges. Additionally, the XIP
header records a dynamic LastNode pointer to one of the nodes in the DAG. This
pointer, initially set to the entry node, reflects the portion of the DAG that has been
realized by this packet by forwarding decisions so far. Thus, when the packet reaches
the intended destination, the LastNode will point to the sink.
To forward a packet, a router first inspects the LastNode field to identify the
progress made through the DAG so far. For each of the outgoing edges from the
referenced node, in priority order, the router attempts to forward on the corresponding
XID. If that XID is local to that router (for example, the XID is an AD and the router
is in that domain), the router updates the LastNode field of the packet and either
recurses on the forwarding decision, or, when LastNode points to the sink, delivers
the packet to the corresponding principal of the sink node. Otherwise, if the XID
is non-local, the router forwards the packet toward the designated XID, as normal.
Finally, if the router cannot forward along any of the outgoing edges of the DAG, the
address is not reachable and the packet is dropped.
Among the many address structures that DAGs afford, three addressing patterns
are commonly used to date: scoping, fallback, and iterative refinement. Scoping a
CID to a given host can be accomplished with an address like • → HID1 → CID1;
this address requires packets first be forwarded to host HID1, and from there, on to
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CID1. When a new XIA principal is being deployed, chances are that many routers
in the network do not know it, this can be addressed with the fallback pattern, which
uses a lower priority edge to route to a well-known principal in case the new principal
is not known by the router making the routing decision. For example, assuming that
the CID principal is not widely deployed, one can still reach CID1 even if HID1 is
the only host aware of the CID principal (dashed edges reflect lower priority):
HID1 CID1
Finally, the iterative refinement pattern combines scoping and fallback patterns. In
the event host addresses such as HID1 are not globally routable, we can have CID1
fall back to an AD XID (AD1) where HID1 is presumed to reside:
AD1 HID1 CID1
Recalling our earlier architectural definitions, note that, unlike IP, XIP is not a
factor, because it does not define any class of identifiers. Therefore, XIA with an
empty set of principals, or equivalently, XIP alone, is not an architecture. On the
other hand, each XIA principal, through the requirement that it introduce its own
eXpressive IDentifiers (XIDs), is a network factor. Through its use of XIA principals
(including those introduced in this section and those in Chapter 4), XIP harmonizes
a broad spectrum of network factors without imposing any static dependencies (as
discussed in Chapter 3). Therefore XIA constitutes a meta architecture. Stakeholders
have to choose a set of factors that, together, instantiate XIA as an architecture. One
plausible choice is inclusion of the AD, HID, and CID principals; this can serve as a
baseline XIA architecture, according to our terminology.
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1.4 Taxonomy of meta architectures
The notion of a meta network architecture that evolves to accommodate unforeseen
network use cases has attracted researchers for decades. Researchers in Sweden de-
veloped Softnet (Zander and Forchheimer, 1983), the first meta architecture of which
we are aware, in the early 1980s. While studying meta architectures, the degree to
which they isolate their factors is enlightening because it highlights the value that
meta architectures offer to applications, which ultimately reflect the utility functions
of their end users. This section groups other meta architectures according to the
degree of isolation between their factors; proceeding from the highest degree of factor
isolation to the lowest.
Network virtualization (Anderson et al., 2005; Sherwood et al., 2010) and SDN/
OpenFlow (McKeown et al., 2008; Bosshart et al., 2013; Feamster et al., 2013) are
natural meta architectures; they do not limit the number of supported factors, nor
do they impose static dependencies among the supported factors. At a high level,
these meta architectures slice network infrastructure into independent, isolated sets
of resource that are used to support their factors; we call this group slicing meta ar-
chitectures. The degree of factor isolation, however, is high, so high that applications
are solely responsible for all the necessary work to leverage multiple factors, which
requires access to multiple slices of the network. Moreover, the high degree of isola-
tion forces the supported factors to be self-sufficient in order to properly operate their
slices. As a result, these meta architectures only support full-blown architectures.
The next group of meta architectures, the translating meta architectures, encom-
passes Plutarch (Crowcroft et al., 2003), FII (Koponen et al., 2011), OPAE (Ghodsi
et al., 2011), Omega (Raghavan et al., 2012a), and SDIA (Raghavan et al., 2012b).
These meta architectures segment the network into independent regions, map each
region to supported factors, and promote bridges between regions to translate the
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protocols in both directions. Similar to slicing meta architectures, supported fac-
tors must in fact be organized into network architectures, but applications are not
solely responsible for interoperability between regions. The troubling aspect of this
group is that facilities for translation between these pluralistic architectures are not
provided, and may not always be possible. For example, there is no clear mapping
between a host-centric architecture, such as IP, and a content-centric one, such as
NDN (Jacobson et al., 2009); Section 4.3 returns to this point.
The third group, active meta architectures, is centered on active networks (Ten-
nenhouse and Wetherall, 1996; Tennenhouse et al., 1997), and most notably ANTS
(Wetherall, 1999), the meta architecture that pursued programmable networks as the
standard-bearer for active networks. ANTS does not slice or segment a network; its
factors share the whole network. Factor designers build factors with mobile code that
is shipped through the network from applications to routers with the help of a code
distribution protocol. While applications can interoperate with multiple factors at
the same time, the runtime environment of mobile code intentionally isolates factors
to address security issues. Nevertheless, factors can be combined to compose a sin-
gle factor. But due to isolation in the runtime environment, factors still have to be
self-sufficient, as with the previous groups of meta architectures.
XIA distinguishes itself from other meta architectures by promoting interoperabil-
ity among all of its supported factors, in the form of XIA principals. This interop-
erability takes place with (1) XIA factors sharing the whole network, as in ANTS,
(2) network addresses enabling factor composition at every address (Sections 1.3 and
2.3.2), and (3) factor designers postponing dependencies among factors until runtime
through routing redirects, an extension of XIA’s routing algorithm that we introduce
in Linux XIA (Section 3.2). Thanks to these mechanisms, XIA factors can delegate
functions and responsibilities to other factors, which, in turn, enables XIA factors to
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specialize. A key novelty is that XIA factors do not have to be self-sufficient, unlike
all of the meta architectures cited above.
The degree of factor isolation has deep effects on meta architectures. A high
degree of isolation forces factors to be architectures, as arises in slicing, translating,
and active meta architectures. In contrast, the low degree of isolation found in XIA
allows factors to specialize and achieve their functionality with minimal form. This
effect is explored in Chapter 4, where we leverage this flexibility when porting designs
onto the XIA meta architecture.
1.5 Thesis statement and approach
The central hypothesis in this dissertation is that an interoperable meta network
architecture can welcome most, if not all, clean-state designs on a level playing field,
yet it leaves the final evaluation of these designs to the broader community. It is
worth pointing out that although we emphasize clean-state designs because they lack
a platform for deployment, XIA welcomes existing designs into its framework as well.
The following chapters demonstrate this hypothesis by defining XIA, describing our
native implementation of XIA, and answering the following questions:
• Is XIA expressive enough to accommodate a broad spectrum of factors? If the
expressiveness of XIA were myopic, our thesis hypothesis would have a rather
limited scope. To answer this question we ported four distinct and unrelated
network architectures onto Linux XIA, namely IP, Serval (Nordstro¨m et al.,
2012), NDN (Jacobson et al., 2009), and ANTS (Wetherall, 1999). None of the
ported architectures were designed for interoperability with XIA. Moreover, the
port of ANTS, an early meta architecture with a high degree of generality, is
the essential step in our larger demonstration that the evolutionary model of
XIA supports a superset of that of ANTS.
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• What is necessary to avoid static dependency among factors? While static
dependency may be spotted in some high-level descriptions of designs, this is
not always the case. Some static dependencies only become apparent when
designs are made concrete through an implementation; this was the case with
XIA. During the development of Linux XIA, static dependency was creeping
into the code due to the need to reuse functionality of factors by other factors.
Avoiding this static dependency required a small change on the forwarding
algorithm of XIA to include what we named routing redirects.
• What is impact of the flexibility built into Linux XIA on forwarding perfor-
mance? Given that Linux XIA supports dynamically loaded factors, routing
redirects, and dynamic routing dependencies on top of XIA’s already flexible
addresses, the forwarding performance of Linux XIA is a concern for anyone
interested in developing factors, or deploying XIA. Not to mention that failing
to realize a reasonable forwarding performance would again limit the scope of
our hypothesis. Linux XIA sports performance results comparable to those of
Linux IP, a mature implementation of TCP/IP, in our simulations of a core
router. The results hold even while accounting for different packet sizes, more
complex addresses used in XIA, and high update rates of the routing table.
During the development of the work to substantiate our thesis hypothesis and to
answer the questions above, we have made a number of other contributions, which
we discuss next.
1.6 Contributions
The central finding of this research is that XIA can instantiate a broad spectrum of
factors, and avoid static dependence among factors. The port of IP, Serval (Nordstro¨m
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et al., 2012), NDN (Jacobson et al., 2009), and ANTS (Wetherall, 1999) provides
evidence of the expressiveness of XIA. The forwarding performance measurements of
Linux XIA show that the additional flexibility is reasonable when compared to IP.
More broadly, we conclude that Linux XIA is a suitable platform for the search of
the next Internet architecture.
The contributions of this dissertation also include the following:
• Clarifying interpretations of network factors, network architectures, and meta
network architectures;
• A taxonomy of meta architectures;
• An open source, fully functional, native implementation of XIA in Linux (Machado,
2013a);
• An open source environment for evaluation of forwarding performance of net-
work stacks implemented in Linux (Machado, 2013b);
• A deployment plan of XIA that leverages the current Internet as a medium to
interconnect XIA networks. Any successful clean-slate architecture will need
to coexist with IP for years (or forever). Our port of IP to XIA shows both
how XIA can emulate IP and how it can progressively wean itself off of IP by
removing dependencies in a staged deprecation;
• A design improvement of Serval that is not possible in its original form; more
specifically, ServalID identifiers are intrinsic secure in XIA, what enables re-
silience against on-path attacks. Serval is a service-centric architecture that
complements Linux XIA with a mobile, multipath, reliable transport;
• Two whitepaper ports of NDN to XIA that expose the tradeoff between sup-
porting dynamic content and public-key management in NDN. NDN, a content-
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centric architecture, embodies a design that may seem to necessitate a stan-
dalone architecture; its port to XIA, in fact, tests aspects of XIA not explored
by other architectures, such as the fundamental role of source addresses.
1.7 Thesis outline
The following chapters are organized as follows. The two following chapters define
XIA and discuss its concepts at a high level of abstraction (Chapter 2), and present key
internals of our Linux implementation of XIA (Chapter 3). While Chapter 2 addresses
the first defining property of meta architectures, namely, the support to a broad
spectrum of factors, it is only in Chapter 3 that we show how to address the second
defining property of meta architectures, that is, how to avoid static dependencies
among factors. While one can appreciate the harmful effects of static dependency at
a high level, it is during the implementation that the second defining property gains
color.
Chapter 4 shows how to map alien designs onto XIA. This chapter accomplishes
many things in parallel to the description of the ports, for example, it (1) presents
a deployment plan of XIA through the port of IP, (2) shows how Serval can become
resilient to on-path attacks, (3) exposes a key tradeoff of NDN as well as a path for
componentization of the design of NDN, and (4) substantiates the generality of XIA
with the port of ANTS to XIA. All those side goals are accomplished while providing
instructive porting examples for other researchers, and fulfilling our view of XIA being
the missing catalyst to bring the next Internet architecture.
After being exposed to all the flexibility that is built into Linux XIA, a natural
question is on how its forwarding performance compare to IP, more specifically, to
Linux’s implementation of IP. Chapter 5 evaluates the forwarding performance of
Linux XIA against that of Linux IP.
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Finally, we present future work directions, a new interpretation of layers in network
architectures, and a summary of our work and view of the future in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
eXpressive Internet (Meta) Architecture
Motivated by limitations in today’s host-centric IP architecture, recent studies have
proposed clean-slate network architectures centered around alternate first-class prin-
cipals, such as content, services, or users. However, much like the host-centric IP
design, elevating one principal above others hinders communication between other
principals and inhibits the network’s capability to evolve. This chapter presents the
eXpressive Internet (Meta) Architecture (XIA), a meta architecture with native sup-
port for multiple principals and the ability to evolve its functionality to accommodate
new, as yet unforeseen, principals over time. We describe key design requirements,
and demonstrate how XIA’s rich addressing and forwarding semantics facilitate flexi-
bility and evolvability, while keeping core network functions simple and efficient. We
describe case studies that demonstrate key functionality that XIA enables.
The content of this chapter borrows extensively from our prior work (Anand et al.,
2011a; Anand et al., 2011b; Han et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the text here has been
harmonized with our new definitions introduced in Section 1.1.
2.1 Introduction
The “narrow waist” design of the Internet has been tremendously successful, helping
to create a flourishing ecosystem of applications and protocols above the waist, and
diverse media, physical layers, and access technologies below. However, the Internet,
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almost by design, does not facilitate a clean, incremental path for the adoption of
new capabilities at the waist. This shortcoming is clearly illustrated by the 15+ year
deployment history of IPv6 and the difficulty of deploying primitives needed to secure
the Internet. Serious barriers to evolvability arise when:
• Protocols, formats, and information must be agreed upon by a large number of
independent actors in the architecture; and
• There is no built-in mechanism that supports (and embraces) incremental de-
ployment of new functionality with minimal friction.
IP today faces both of these barriers. First, senders, receivers, and every router
in between must agree on the format and meaning of the IP header. It is not possi-
ble, therefore, for a destination to switch to IPv6-based addressing and still remain
reachable by unmodified senders who use IPv4. Second, today’s paths to incremen-
tal deployment typically involve tunnels or overlays, which have the drawback that
they hide the new functionality from the existing network. For example, enabling a
single router in a legacy network to support some form of content-centric networking
is fruitless if that traffic ends up being tunneled through the network using IPv41.
This chapter presents a meta architecture, called the eXpressive Internet (Meta)
Architecture or XIA, that addresses these problems from the ground up. XIA main-
tains some features of the current Internet, such as a narrow waist that networks must
support, and packet switching, but it differs from today’s Internet in several areas.
The philosophy underlying the design of XIA is, simply, that we do not be-
lieve we can predict the usage models for the Internet of 50 years hence. The re-
search community has presented compelling arguments for supporting many types of
communication—content-centric architecture (Jacobson et al., 2009; Trossen et al.,
2010), service-based communication (Nordstro¨m et al., 2012; Saif and Paluska, 2003),
1Without resorting to deep packet inspection of various sorts, which itself is typically fragile.
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multicast (Deering, 1991), user-centric architecture (Ford, 2008), enhanced support
for mobility (Snoeren and Balakrishnan, 2000; Raychaudhuri et al., 2010; Zhuang
et al., 2003), and so on. We believe that a new network architecture should facilitate
any or all of these capabilities, and it must be possible to enable or disable “native”
support for them as makes sense in that time and place.
The key architectural element that XIA adds to improve evolvability is one we call
expressing intent. XIA’s addresses can simultaneously express both a “new” type of
address (or addresses), and one or more backwards compatible pathways to reach that
address. This notion is best explained by example: Consider the process of retrieving
a particular piece of content (CID) using a network that provides only host-to-host
communication, much like today’s Internet. The source would send a packet destined
to a destination network (Dom); the destination network would deliver it to a host;
the host would deliver it to a process providing a service (Srv) such as HTTP; and
the process would reply with the desired content, as such:
Dom Hst Srv CID
XIA makes this path explicit in addressing, and allows flexibility in expressing
it, e.g., “The source really just wants to retrieve this content, and it does not care
whether it goes through Dom to get it.” As a result, this process of content retrieval
might be expressed in XIA by specifying the destination address as a directed acyclic
graph, not a single address, like this:
Dom Hst Srv CID
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By expressing the destination in this way, senders give flexibility to the network
to satisfy their intent. Imagine a future network in which the destination domain
supported routing directly to services (Nordstro¨m et al., 2012) (instead of needing
to route to a particular host). Using the address as expressed above, this hypothet-
ical network would already have both the information it needs (the service ID) and
permission to do so (the link from the source directly to the service ID). A router
or other network element that does not know how to operate on, e.g., the service
ID, would simply route the packet to the furthest-along node that it does know (the
domain or the host in this example). Note that the sender can use the same address
before and after support for service routing is introduced.
XIA terms the identifiers on each node in an address eXpressive IDentifiers (XIDs);
the supported principals define the XIDs. Examples of supported principals include
hosts, autonomous domains (analogous to today’s autonomous systems), services,
content IDs, and so on. The set of principals in XIA is not fixed: hosts or applications
can define new principals and begin using them at any time, without waiting for
support from the network. Of course, if they want to get anything done, they must
also express a way to get their work done in the current network. We believe that the
ability to express not just “how to do it today”, but also the application’s underlying
intent, is key to enabling future evolvability.
The second difference between XIA and today’s Internet comes from a design
philosophy that encourages creating principals that have intrinsic security : the abil-
ity for an entity to validate that it is communicating with the correct counterpart
without needing access to external databases, information, or configuration. An ex-
ample of an intrinsically secure address is using the hash of a public key for a host
address (Andersen et al., 2008). With this mechanism, the host can prove that it sent
a particular packet to any receiver who knows its host address. Intrinsic security is
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central to reliable sharing of information between principals and the network and to
ensuring correct fulfillment of the contract between them. It can furthermore be used
to bootstrap higher level security mechanisms.
We outline novel design ideas for evolution (Section 2.2), and systematically incor-
porate them into the eXpressive Internet Protocol (XIP) (Section 2.3). Then, through
concrete examples, we show how networks, hosts, and applications interact with each
other and benefit from XIA’s flexibility and evolvability (Section 2.4). Finally, we
discuss related work (Section 2.5) and conclude (Section 2.6).
2.2 Foundational ideas of XIA
XIA is based upon three core ideas for designing an evolvable and secure Internet
architecture:
1. Principals as the units of evolution. Applications can use one or more prin-
cipals to directly express their intent to access specific functionality. Each principal
defines its own “narrow waist”, with an interface for applications and ways in which
routers should process packets destined to a particular type of principal.
XIA supports an open-ended set of principals, from the familiar (hosts), to those
popular in current research (content, or services), to those that we have yet to for-
malize. As new principals are introduced, applications may start to use these new
principals at any time, even before the network has been modified to natively support
the new function. This allows incremental deployment of native network support
without further change to the network endpoints, as we will explore through exam-
ples in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3. Every time that a principal is introduced or removed
from the set of deployed principals, the network evolves.
Establishing principals as the units of evolution in XIA clearly distinguishes XIA
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from previous meta architectures. Design decisions have motivated previous meta
architectures to keep a higher degree of isolation among their supported factors, which
has forced these factors to be architectures (Section 1.4). Enabling non-self-sufficient
principals in XIA allows principals to specialize their semantic and functionality to
what they do best, which, in turn, increases the chance of principals to be reused in
contexts not foreseen by their designer2.
2. Flexible addressing. XIA aims to avoid the “bootstrapping problem”: why
develop applications or protocols that depend on network functionality that does
not yet exist, and why develop network functionality when no applications can use
it? XIA provides a built-in mechanism for enabling new functions to be deployed
piecewise, e.g., starting from the applications and hosts, then, if popular enough,
providing gradual network support. The key challenge is: how should a legacy router
in the middle of the network handle a new principal type that it does not recognize?
To address this, we introduce the architectural notion of a fallback. Fallbacks allow
communicating parties to specify alternative action(s) if routers cannot operate upon
the primary intent. We provide details in Section 2.3.2.
3. Intrinsically secure identifiers. IP is notoriously hard to secure, as network
security was not a first-order consideration in its design. XIA aims to build security
into the core architecture as much as possible, without impairing expressiveness. In
particular, principals used in XIA source and destination addresses are strongly en-
couraged to be intrinsically secure, i.e., cryptographically derived from the associated
communicating entities in a principal-specific fashion. This allows communicating
entities to more accurately ascertain the security and integrity of their transfers; for
2 A good example of the value of specialization is available later, in Chapter 4, with principal
LPM. LPM is reused in Section 4.2 for a totally different motivation from the one that led to its
introduction in Section 4.1.
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example, a publisher can attest that it delivered specific bytes to the intended re-
cipients. Section 2.3.1 describes the intrinsic security of some principals as well as
the specification requirements for intrinsic security for new principals. While we ex-
pect the principal designers will prefer to support intrinsic security wherever possible,
we recognize that some valuable principals may not have such an enabling security
property; see Section 4.1 for examples.
2.3 eXpressive Internet Protocol
XIA facilitates communication between a rich set of principals. We therefore split
both the design and our discussion of communication within XIA into two compo-
nents: the XIP protocol, and XIA forwarding behavior. First, the basic building
block of per-hop communication is the core eXpressive Internet Protocol, or XIP.
XIP is principal-independent, and defines an address format, packet header, and
associated packet processing logic. A key element of XIP is a flexible format for spec-
ifying multiple paths to a destination principal, allowing for “fallback” or “backwards-
compatible” paths that use, e.g., more traditional autonomous system and host-based
communication.
The second component is the per-hop processing for each principal type. Princi-
pals name entities that they define with uniquely typed, expressive identifiers which
we refer to as XIDs. In this chapter, we focus on host, service, content, and ad-
ministrative domain principals to provide examples of how XIA supports multiple
principals. We refer to the above types as HIDs, SIDs, CIDs, and ADs, respectively.
The set of principals is extensible, and more examples are found in Chapter 4.
Our goal is for the set of deployed principals to evolve over time. We envision
that an initial deployment of XIA would mandate support for ADs and HIDs, which
provide global reachability for host-to-host communication—a core building block
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today. Support for other principals would be optional and over time, future network
architects could mandate or remove the mandate for these or other principals as the
needs of the network change. Or, put more colloquially, we do not see the need for
ADs and HIDs disappearing any time soon, but our own short-sightedness should not
tie the hands of future designers!
2.3.1 Principals
The specification of a principal must define:
1. The semantics of communicating with the entities that the principal defines.
2. One or more unique XID types, methods for allocating XIDs, and, when possi-
ble, a definition of the intrinsic security properties of any communication involv-
ing these XIDs. We expect that these intrinsically secure XIDs will typically
be globally unique, even if, for scalability, they are routed using hierarchical
means, and that they will be generated in a distributed and collision-resistant
way. Nevertheless, given the diversity of architectures, innovative ways to define
XIDs are going to be common as well; Chapter 4 explores some examples.
3. Any principal-specific per-hop processing and routing of packets that must ei-
ther be coordinated or kept consistent in a distributed fashion.
These three features together define the principal-specific support for a new principal.
The following material describes the administrative domain, host, service, and content
principals in terms of these features.
Network and host principals represent autonomous routing domains and hosts
that attach to the network. ADs provide hierarchy or scoping for other principals,
that is, they primarily provide control over routing. Hosts have a single identifier
that is constant regardless of the interface used or network that a host is attached
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to. ADs and HIDs are self-certifying: they are generated by hashing the public key
of an autonomous domain or a host, unforgeably binding the key to the address. The
format of ADs and HIDs and their intrinsic security properties are similar to those of
the network and host identifiers used in AIP (Andersen et al., 2008).
Services represent an application service running on one or more hosts within the
network. Examples range from an SSH daemon running on a host, to a Web server, to
Akamai’s global content distribution service, to Google’s search service. Each service
will use its own application protocol, such as HTTP, for its interactions. An SID is
the hash of the public key of a service. To interact with a service, an application
transmits packets with the SID of the service as the destination address. Any entity
communicating with an SID can verify that the service has the private key associated
with the SID. This allows the communicating entity to verify the destination and
bootstrap further encryption or authentication.
In today’s Internet, the true endpoints of communication are typically application
processes—other than, e.g., ICMP messages, very few packets are sent to an IP
destination without specifying application port numbers at a higher layer. In XIA,
this notion of processes as the true destination can be made explicit by specifying
an SID associated with the application process (e.g., a socket) as the intent. An
AD, HID pair can be used as the “legacy path” to ensure global reachability, in
which case the AD forwards the packet to the host, and the host then forwards it
to the appropriate process (SID). Section 2.4 shows that making the true process-
level destination explicit facilitates transparent process migration, which is difficult
in today’s IP networks because the true destination is hidden as state in the receiving
end-host.
Lastly, the content principal allows applications to express their intent to retrieve
content without regard to its location. Sending a request packet to a CID initiates
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retrieval of the content from either a host, an in-network content cache, or other
future source. CIDs are the cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA-1, RIPEMD-160) of the
associated content. The self-certifying nature of this identifier allows any network
element to verify that the content retrieved matches its content identifier.
2.3.2 XIP addressing
Next, we introduce key concepts for XIP addresses that support the long-term evolu-
tion of principals, the encoding mechanism for these addresses, and a representative
set of addressing “styles” supported in XIP.
Core concepts in addressing
XIA provides native support for multiple principals, allowing senders to express their
intent by specifying an XID as part of the XIP destination address. However, XIA’s
design goal of evolvability implies that a principal used as the intent of an XIP address
may not be supported by all routers. Evolvability thus leads us to the architectural
notion of fallback: intent that may not be globally understood must be expressed
with an alternative backwards compatible route, such as a globally routable service
or a host, that can satisfy the request corresponding to the intent. This fallback
is expressed within an XIP address since it may be needed to reach the intended
destination.
XIP addressing must also deal with the fact that not all XID types will be globally
routable, for example, due to scalability issues. This problem is typically addressed
through scoping based on network identifiers (Andersen et al., 2008). Since XIA
supports multiple principals, we generalize scoping by allowing the use of XID types
other than ADs for scoping. For example, scaling global flat routing for CIDs may
be prohibitively expensive (Stoica et al., 2002; Balakrishnan et al., 2004), and, thus,
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addresses containing only a CID may not be routable. Allowing the application to
refine its intent using hierarchical scoping using ADs, HIDs, or another principal to
help specify the CID’s location can improve scalability and eliminate the need for
XID-level global routing.
The drawback of scoping intent is that a narrow interpretation could limit the
network’s flexibility to satisfy the intent in the most efficient manner, e.g., by deliver-
ing content from the nearest cache holding a copy of the CID, rather than routing to
a specific publisher. We can avoid this limitation by combining fallback and scoping,
a concept we call (iterative) refinement of intent. When using refinement of intent,
we give the XID at each scoping step the opportunity to satisfy the intent directly
without having to traverse the remainder of the scoping hierarchy.
Addressing mechanisms
XIA’s addressing scheme is a direct realization of these high-level concepts. To im-
plement fallback, scoping, and iterative refinement, XIA uses a restricted directed
acyclic graph (DAG) representation of XIDs to specify XIP addresses. A packet con-
tains both the destination DAG and the source DAG to which a reply can be sent.
Because of symmetry, we describe only the destination address.
Three basic building blocks are: intent, fallback, and scoping. XIP addresses must
have a single intent, which can be of any XID type. The simplest XIP address has
only an entry node and an intent (I) as the sink: • → I. The entry node (•) appears
in all visualizations of XIP addresses to represent the conceptual source of the packet,
and to indicate where the navigation of the address begins.
A fallback is represented using an additional XID (F) and a “fallback” edge (dotted
line):
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The fallback edge can be taken if a direct route to the intent is unavailable; we
allow up to four outgoing edges of each node, including the entry node. Section 2.3.3
justifies this fanout limit.
Scoping of intent is represented as: • → S → I. This structure means that the
packet must be first routed to a scoping XID S, even if the intent is directly routable.
These building blocks are combined to form more generic DAG addresses that
deliver rich semantics, implementing the high-level concepts described above. To
forward a packet, routers traverse edges in the address in order and forward using the
next routable XID. Detailed behavior of packet processing is specified in Section 2.3.3.
Addressing style examples
XIP’s DAG addressing provides considerable flexibility. In this subsection, we present
three (non-exhaustive) “styles” of how it might be used to achieve important archi-
tectural goals.
Supporting evolution: The destination address encodes a service XID as the intent,
and an autonomous domain and a host are provided as a fallback path, in case routers
do not understand the new principal:
AD1 HID1 SID1
This scheme provides both fallback and scalable routing. A router outside of AD1
that does not know how to route based on intent SID1 directly will instead route to
AD1.
Iterative refinement: In this example, every node includes a direct edge to the
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intent, with fallback to domain and host-based routing. This allows iterative incre-
mental refinement of the intent. If the CID1 is unknown, the packet is then forwarded
to AD1. If AD1 cannot route to the CID, it forwards the packet to HID1.
AD1 HID1 CID1
An example of the flexibility afforded by this addressing is that an on-path content-
caching router could directly reply to a CID query without forwarding the query
to the content source. We term this on-path interception. Moreover, if technology
advances to the point that content IDs became globally routable, the network and
applications could benefit directly, without changes to applications.
Service binding and more: DAGs also enable application control in various con-
texts. In the case of legacy HTTP, while the initial packet may go to any host
handling the web service, subsequent packets of the same “session” (e.g., HTTP
keep-alive) must go to the same host. In XIA, we do so by having the initial packet
destined for: • → AD1 → SID1. A router inside AD1 routes the request to a host
that provides SID1. The service replies with a source address bound to the host,
• → AD1 → HID1 → SID1, to which subsequent packets can be sent. We explore
an alternative approach to service binding in the context of our port of Serval, as
described in Chapter 4.
Other uses of DAG addresses are described in (Anand et al., 2011a). Some po-
tential uses of DAG-based addresses, such as source routing, raise questions of policy
and authorization, which have been addressed in the literature (Zhang et al., 2011;
Naous et al., 2011; Zhao et al., 2012).
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Figure 2·1: XIP packet header.
2.3.3 XIP header and per-hop processing
This section describes the XIP packet format and per-hop processing that routers
perform on packets. Later, in Chapter 5, we show that this design satisfies both the
requirements for flexibility and efficient router processing.
Header format
Figure 2·1 shows the header format. Our header encodes a source and a destination
DAG, and as a result our address is variable-length—NumDst and NumSrc indicate the
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size of the destination and source address, respectively. The header contains fields
for version, next header, payload length, and hop limit.
Our header stores a pointer, LastNode, to the previously visited node in the
destination address, for routers to know where to begin forwarding lookups. This
makes per-hop processing more efficient by enabling routers to process a partial DAG
instead of a full DAG in general.
DAGs are stored as adjacency lists. Each node in the adjacency list contains three
fields: an XID Type; a 160-bit XID; and an array of the node indices that represent
the node’s outgoing edges in the DAG. The adjacency list format allows at most four
outgoing edges per node (Edge0. . . Edge3). This choice balances: (a) the per-hop
processing cost, overall header size, and simple router implementation; with (b) the
desire to flexibly express many styles of addressing. However, we do not limit the
degree of expressibility; one can express more outgoing edges by using a special node
with a predefined XIDType to represent indirection.
Note that our choice of 160-bit XID adds large overhead, which could be unac-
ceptable for bandwidth or power-limited devices. We believe, however, that common
header compression techniques (Lilley et al., 2000) can effectively reduce the header
size substantially without much computational overhead.
The XIP header packs DAG addresses using topological sorting. Any DAG is
guaranteed to have at least one topological ordering, and the ordering can be easily
found by applying a typical topological sorting algorithm. The topological ordering
brings two good properties: cheap verification that an XIP address does not have
cycles, and a compact encoding of the entry node. Due to the topological ordering, a
node cannot have edges pointing to nodes that appear before the node; by exploiting
this fact, hosts can quickly check if the adjacency list indeed represents a DAG (i.e.
has no cycle). Similarly, the sink node cannot precede other nodes, so the sink node
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Figure 2·2: Simplified diagram of an XIP router.
always appears at the bottom of the adjacency list. For compact encoding, the entry
node’s edges reuse the sink node’s edge fields, which are always empty.
Per-hop processing
Figure 2·2 depicts a simplified flow diagram for packet processing in an XIP router.
The edges represent the flow of packets among processing components. Shaded el-
ements are principal specific, whereas other elements are common to all principals.
Our design isolates principal-type specific logic to make it easier to add support for
new principals.
Routers are required to forward packets according to the intent expressed in each
DAG destination address. Therefore, a valid set of packet forwarding decisions at
routers must correspond to a successful traversal of the DAG from entry node to sink
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to achieve the final intent. When a packet arrives, a router iteratively examines the
outbound edges of the last-visited node of the DAG in priority order. The LastNode
field, initially set to the entry node, reflects the portion of the DAG that has been
realized by this packet by forwarding decisions so far. Thus, when the packet reaches
the intended destination, the LastNode will point to the sink. We refer the node
pointed by the edge in consideration as the next destination.
To attempt to forward along an adjacency, the router examines the XID type of the
next destination. If the router supports that principal, it invokes a principal-specific
component based on the XID type; this is what enables principals to customize the
forwarding mechanism. If the router does not support the principal or does not have
an appropriate forwarding rule, it moves on to the next edge. If no outgoing edge
of the last-visited node can be used for forwarding, the destination is considered
unreachable and the packet is dropped. Principals decide when LastNode field is
updated. For example, if the next destination is an AD XID, and the router is in
that domain, the router updates the LastNode field of the packet and either recurses
on the forwarding decision, or, when LastNode points to the sink, delivers the packet
to the corresponding principal of the sink node. When an edge is chosen, the router
sets the most significant bit of the entry of the edge array used to forward the packet;
these marks are useful for probing and debugging.
Optimizations for high performance
The per-hop processing of XIA is more complex than that of IP, which raises obvious
concerns about the performance of routers, especially in scenarios using more complex
DAGs for addressing. In this subsection, we argue that, despite those concerns, an
XIP router can achieve comparable performance to IP routers by taking advantage
of well-known optimizations, such as parallel processing and fast-path evaluation.
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Packet-level parallelism: By processing multiple packets concurrently, parallel
packet processing can speed up XIP forwarding. Fortunately for XIP, the packet pro-
cessing of principals such as AD and HID resembles IP processing in terms of data
dependencies; the forwarding path contains no per-packet state changes at all. In
addition, the AD and HID lookup tables are the only shared, global data structure,
and like IP forwarding tables, their update rate is relatively infrequent (once a sec-
ond or so). This makes it relatively straightforward to process packets destined for
ADs and HIDs in parallel. While SID and CID packet processing may have com-
mon data structures shared by pipelines, any data update can be deferred for less
synchronization overhead as the processing can be opportunistic and can always fall
back into AD and HID packet processing. This makes CID and SID packet processing
parallelizable.
Packet-parallel processing may result in out-of-order packet delivery, which dis-
rupts existing congestion control mechanisms in TCP/IP networks (Ludwig and Katz,
2000). One solution is to preserve intra-flow packet ordering by serializing packets
from the same flow and executing them in the same pipeline processor, or alternatively
by using a reordering buffer (Govind et al., 2007; Wu et al., 2009). An alternative
solution is to design to ensure that congestion control and reliability techniques de-
ployed in XIP networks are more tolerant of reordering (Blanton and Allman, 2002).
Intra-packet parallelism: As discussed earlier, a DAG may encode multiple next-
hop candidates as a forwarding destination. Since the evaluation of each candidate
can be done in parallel, this address structure also enables intra-packet parallel pro-
cessing. While the different next-hops can be evaluated in parallel, the results of
these lookups must be combined and only the highest priority next-hop candidate
with a successful lookup should be used. Note that this synchronization stage is ex-
pensive in software implementations and this type of parallelism is most appropriate
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in specialized hardware implementations.
Fast-path evaluation: Finally, the XIP design can use fast-path processing to
speed commonly observed addresses—either as an optimization to reduce average
power consumption, or to construct low cost routers that do not require the robust,
worst-case performance of backbone routers. For example, Linux XIA caches routing
decisions (i.e. the output port and the new last-node value) for sets of edges pointed
by the LastNode field. When a packet’s destination address matches an entry in the
cache, the router simply takes the cached result and skips all other destination lookup
processing (Section 3.2). Otherwise, the router pushes the packet into the original
slow-path processing path. Since the processing cost of this fast path does not depend
on the address used, this performance optimization may also help conceal the impact
of packet processing time variability caused by differences in DAG complexity.
Chapter 5 shows that the combination of these optimizations enables XIP routers
to forward at speeds comparable to IP routers.
2.4 XIP addresses in action
We now elaborate how the abstractions introduced in previous sections can be put
to work to create an XIA network. The following subsections explain how addresses
are created and obtained, and show how XIA’s architectural components can work
together to support rich applications.
2.4.1 Bootstrapping addresses
We assume the existence of autonomous domains and a global inter-domain routing
protocol for ADs, e.g., as discussed in (Andersen et al., 2008). We walk through how
HIDs, SIDs, and CIDs join a network, and how communication occurs.
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Attaching hosts to a network: Each host has a public/private key pair. As a
first step, each host listens for a periodic advertisement that its AD sends out. This
message contains the public key of the AD, plus possibly “well-known” services that
the AD provides such as a name resolution service. Using this information, the host
then sends an association packet to the AD, which will be forwarded by the AD
routers to a service that can proceed with authentication based on the respective
public keys.
Advertising services and content: Applications create XIA sockets through the
standard POSIX socket API in Linux XIA. In contrast, XIA’s original prototype (XIA
Team, 2013), which is implemented in the Click modular router (Kohler et al., 2000),
uses a variation of the POSIX socket API. Since the CID principal is only imple-
mented in the XIA prototype and not in Linux XIA, all references below to CID’s
API refer to the prototype. The prototype’s API is described in detail in our technical
report (Anand et al., 2011a). We describe here how hosts can advertise services and
content using these APIs.
To advertise a service, a process running on a host first calls bind() to bind itself
to a public key of the service. This binding inserts the SID (the hash of the service’s
public key) into the host’s routing table so that the service is reachable through the
host. Likewise, putContent() stores the CID (the hash of the content) in the host’s
routing table. Since at this point, services and content are only locally routable,
request packets will have to be scoped using the host’s HID, e.g., • → AD1 →
HID1 → CID1, to reach the intent.
For a service or a content to be reachable more broadly, the routing information
must be propagated. For example, an AD can support direct routing to services and
content within its domain using an intra-domain routing protocol that propagates the
SIDs and CIDs supported by each host or in-network cache to the routers. Global
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route propagation can be handled by an inter-domain routing protocol, subject to the
AD’s policies and business relationships. We leave the exact mechanism, protocol,
and policy for principal-specific routing (e.g., content or service routing) as future
research.
Obtaining XIP addresses: Now we look into how two parties (hosts, services,
or content) can obtain source and destination XIP addresses to communicate. As
in today’s Internet, obtaining addresses is the application’s responsibility. Here, we
provide a few example scenarios of how XIP addresses can be created.
Source addresses specify the return address to the specific instance of the principal
(i.e., a bound address). Therefore, when a principal generates a packet, the source
address is generally of the form • → AD1 → HID1 → XID13. The AD-prefix is given
by the AD when a host attaches to the network; the HID is known by the host; and
the XID is provided by the application, allowing the socket layer to create the source
address. XIDs will often be ephemeral SIDs; In this case, an application creates an
SID’s keys and calls bind() to bind the source address before calling connect(). The
explicit binding ensures that the private key of the SID never leaves the application,
and gives applications flexibility to create their source addresses, which could be more
sophisticated than the one described here to include, for example, alternative network
paths in case the primary path fails. An XIA library available for applications does
most of the work applications have to do, so, from the application’s point of view,
the extra work described above is mostly transparent like TCP/IP’s auto-binding of
sockets.
Destination addresses can be obtained in many alternative ways. One way is to
use a name resolution service to resolve XIP addresses from human readable names.
3 When communication happens within a domain, the common AD prefix can be omitted from
both destination and source addresses.
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For example, a lookup of “Google search” in the name resolution service can return
a DAG that includes the intent SID along with one or more fallback ADs that host
(advertised) instances of the service (similar to today’s DNS SRV records). Alter-
natively, a Web service can embed URLs in its pages that include an intent CID
for an image or document, along with the original source (• → AD1 → HID1) or
content-distribution SIDs as fallbacks. This information can be in the form of a
“ready-to-use” DAG, or as separate fields that can be assembled into a destination
address (e.g., iterative refinement style) by the client based on local preferences. For
example, the client could choose to receive content via a specific CDN based on the
network interface it is using.
Note that we intentionally placed the burden of specifying fallbacks to the appli-
cation layer. This is because a fallback is an authoritative location of an intent that
the underlying network may not know about. Name resolution systems and other
application-layer systems are more suitable to provide such information in a globally
consistent manner. On the other hand, network optimizations can be applied locally
in a much more dynamic fashion. Networks may choose to locally optimize for intent
by locally replicating the object of intent and dynamically routing the intent.
A final point is that client ADs may have policies for what addresses are allowed.
For example, it may want to specify that all packets entering or leaving the AD go
through a firewall. This can be achieved by inserting an HIDFirewall in the address,
e.g., • → AD1 → HIDFirewall → HID1 → SID1, for a source address.
2.4.2 Simple application scenarios
In this section and the next, we use the example of online banking to walk through
the lifecycle of an XIA application and its interaction with a client. Our goal is to
illustrate how XIA’s support for multiple principals as well as its addressing format
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Figure 2·3: Bank of the Future example scenario.
gives significant flexibility and control to applications.
In Figure 2·3, Bank of the Future (BoF) provides a secure online banking service
hosted at a large data center on the XIA Internet. The service runs on many BoF
servers and has a public key that hashes to SIDBoF . We assume that all components
in BoF’s network natively support service and content principals. We focus on a
banking interaction between a particular client host HIDC , and a particular BoF
process PS running on server HIDS.
Publishing the service: When process PS starts on the server, it binds an SID
socket to SIDBoF by calling bind() with its public/private key pair. This SID
binding adds SIDBoF to the server S’s routing table, and the route to SIDBoF is
advertised in the BoF network ADBoF . The service also publishes the association
between a human readable service name (e.g., “Bank of the Future Online”) and
• → ADBoF → SIDBoF through a global name resolution service (SIDResolv).
46
Connection initiation and binding: When a client wants to connect to the ser-
vice, it first contacts the name resolution service SIDResolv to obtain the service ad-
dress. It then initiates a connection by sending a packet destined to • → ADBoF →
SIDBoF using the socket API. The source address is • → ADC → HIDC → SIDC ,
where ADC is the AD of the client, and SIDC is the ephemeral SID. This packet
is routed to ADBoF and then to an instance of SIDBoF . After the initial exchange,
both processes will establish a session, which includes, for example, establishing a
symmetric key derived from their public/private key pairs. Because of this session
state, the client needs to continue to communicate with the same server, not just
any server that supports SIDBoF . To ensure this, the client changes the destination
address to • → ADBoF → HIDS → SIDBoF , where HIDS is the server that it is
currently talking to.
Content transfer: The client can now download content from the online banking
service. For convenience, we assume that the content being transferred is a Web page.
Let us consider both static (faq.html) and dynamic content (statement.html), both of
which may contain static images. For static (cacheable) content, the SIDBoF service
will provide the client with the CIDfaq of the static Web page faq.html along with
the CIDs of the images contained in it. The client can then issue parallel requests
for those content identifiers, e.g., using • → ADBoF → CIDfaq as the destination
address for the Web page. The request for dynamic (non-cacheable) content, e.g., a
list of recent bank transactions, is directly sent to SIDBoF .
2.4.3 Support for richer scenarios
Using the example above, we now show how XIA’s addressing format can support
more challenging scenarios such as evolution towards content networking, process
migration, and client mobility.
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Network evolution for content support: The previous section described how
the client can specify static content using scoped intent. Switching to the iterative
refinement style (Section 2.3.2):
ADBoF HID1 CID1
means that routing through the specified ADBoF or HID1 is optional, and opens the
door for any set of XIA routers to satisfy the client’s request for static content.
The DAG address format supports incremental deployment of content support in
an XIA Internet. As a first step, BoF can deploy support for CIDs internally in its
network. Even if no ISPs support CIDs, the above address will allow the delivery of
the above request (using the ADBoF ) to the BoF network, where the intent CID1
can be served.
As the next step, some ISPs may incrementally deploy on-path caches. The above
address allows them to opportunistically serve content, which may allow them to cut
costs by reducing their payments to upstream service providers (Agyapong and Sirbu,
2011). Over time, as support for content-centric networking expands, ISPs may make
bilateral agreements to enable access to each other’s (cached) content. XIA can help
leverage such off-path caches as well; of course, it would require ISPs to exchange
information about cached content and update router forwarding tables appropriately.
Process migration: XIA’s addressing can also support seamless process (service)
migration through rebinding. Suppose that the server process PS migrates to another
machine, namely HIDT , as part of load balancing or due to a failure; we assume
that appropriate OS support for process migration is available. At the start of mi-
gration, the route to SIDBoF is removed from the old server and added to the new
server’s routing table. Before migration, the service communication was bound to • →
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ADBoF → HIDS → SIDBoF . After migration, the OS notifies the ongoing connec-
tions of the new HID, and the binding is changed to • → ADBoF → HIDT → SIDBoF
at the socket layer. Notification of the binding change propagates to the client via
a packet containing the message authentication code (MAC) signed by SIDBoF that
certifies the binding change. When the client accepts the binding change message, the
client updates the socket’s destination address. To minimize packet drops, in-flight
packets from the client can be forwarded to the new server by putting a redirection
entry to SIDBoF in the routing table entry of the old server.
Client mobility: The same rebinding mechanism can be used to support client
mobility in a way that generalizes approaches such as TCP Migrate (Snoeren and
Balakrishnan, 2000). When a client moves and attaches to another AD, ADnew, the
new source address of the client becomes: • → ADnew → HIDC → SIDC . When
a rebind message arrives at the server, the server updates the binding of the client’s
address.
Although the locations of both the server and the client have changed in the
previous two examples, the two SID end-points did not change. The intrinsic security
property remains the same because it relies on the SID. Both the server and the client
can verify that they are talking to the services whose public keys hash to SIDBoF
and SIDC .
2.5 Related work
XIA borrows broadly from purist architectures, discussions on evolving the Internet
architecture, and conceptual foundations. The following material highlights how XIA
connects to these related works, and how we integrated them into XIA to move toward
our goal of finding the next Internet architecture.
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Principal blueprints: Substantial prior work has examined the benefits of network
architectures tailored for specific principals, that is, purist architectures. We view this
work as largely complementary to ours, and we have drawn upon it in the design of
individual principals presented in this chapter. The set of relevant architectural work
is large and includes proposals for
• Content-centric architectures: NDN (Jacobson et al., 2009), DONA (Koponen
et al., 2007), TRIAD (Cheriton and Gritter, 2000);
• Service-centric architectures: SCAFFOLD (Freedman et al., 2010), Serval (Nord-
stro¨m et al., 2012);
• User-centric architectures: MPA (Maniatis et al., 1999), UIA (Ford, 2008);
• Host-centric architecture: IP;
• Multicast architectures: TOMA (Lao et al., 2005), LIPSIN (Jokela et al., 2009);
• Delay-tolerant architecture: DTN (Fall, 2003);
among others. It is worth pointing out that although some works identify themselves
as overlays, they are, according to our definitions, network architectures. They de-
fine new class of identifiers and specialized forwarding behaviors on those identifiers,
and address all questions necessary to make the whole design fully functional (i.e.
self-sufficient). We see their choice of shaping their designs into overlays as a prag-
matic decision to make their work readily deployable. Thus, including papers more
broadly about overlay networks in general, the list above grows even larger to include
works such as (Keromytis et al., 2002; Stoica et al., 2002; Subramanian et al., 2004;
Dingledine et al., 2004).
Not only do these network architectures offer sources of inspiration to design XIA
principals, they are also themselves targets to be ported to XIA. Chapter 4 describes
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the port of three purist architectures: IP (Section 4.1), Serval (Section 4.2), and NDN
(Section 4.3). The port of purist architectures to XIA substantiates the evolvability
claim of XIA as well as provides a level playing field to compare architectures and to
specialize their principals.
Evolving the Internet architecture: Besides the research effort on meta archi-
tectures, which is covered in Section 1.4 and 4.4, the broad discussion on evolving the
Internet architecture has explored network evolution from different angles. For ex-
ample, Ratnasamy et al. propose deployable modifications to IP to enable migration
from IPv4 to any other architecture (Ratnasamy et al., 2005). While XIA could be
such a candidate architecture, their approach is better suited when there is a consen-
sus on what architecture to adopt next. Others have argued that we should concede
that IP (and HTTP) are here to stay, and simply evolve networks atop them (Popa
et al., 2010). However, this is not a solution in the long run; EvoArch (Akhshabi and
Dovrolis, 2011) points out that merely pushing the narrow waist from layer 3 to layer
5 would result in yet another “ossified” layer.
Self-certifying identifiers were used in many systems (Moskowitz and Nikander,
2006; Mazie`res et al., 1999). To the best of our knowledge, the first work to establish
intrinsic security on network identifiers was the meta architecture ANTS (Wetherall,
1999). Nevertheless, intrinsic security is not pervasive in ANTS; no other class of
identifiers in ANTS is defined intrinsically securely. AIP (Andersen et al., 2008) used
self-certifying identifiers for both network and host addresses, as XIP does, to simplify
network-level security mechanisms. Several content-based networking proposals, such
as DONA (Koponen et al., 2007), use them to ensure the authenticity of content.
These works demonstrate the substantial power of these intrinsically secure identifiers,
which XIA generalizes to an architectural level.
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Addressing schemes: The flexibility of DAG addresses has been used elsewhere,
notably Slick Packets (Nguyen et al., 2011). Our addressing scheme uses this concept
in a new way to provide support for network evolution.
Related concepts: Clark et al. present a compelling argument for the need to
enable competition at an architectural level (Clark et al., 2002), which is internal-
ized in XIA. We believe that there are substantial benefits to ensuring that applica-
tions are free to choose their form of communication yet are still capable of sharing
a single Internet instance. Role-Based Architecture (RBA) (Braden et al., 2003)
promotes a non-layered design where a role provides a modularized functionality—
similar to XIA’s principal-specific processing. Although XIA and RBA diverge at
the approaches, XIA can be seen as a layerless architecture; Section 6.2 exposes this
perspective.
2.6 Conclusions
XIA builds upon the TCP/IP stack’s proven ability to accommodate technology evo-
lution at higher and lower network layers by incorporating evolvability directly into
the narrow waist of the network. The centerpiece of our design, XIP, is a network-
layer substrate that enables network innovation. The principals AD, HID, CID, and
SID, which are specifically designed for XIA and introduced in this chapter, and
those principals ported to XIA in Chapter 4 demonstrate that XIP supports and
amalgamates diverse sets of principals.
Our definition of a meta architecture (Section 1.1) has two requirements, namely,
the support of a broad spectrum of principals, and no static dependency among prin-
cipals. Although this chapter starts to address the first requirement while presenting
XIA, static dependency is completely absent in the high-level discussion of this chap-
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ter. The reason for this is that the issue of static dependency has only crept in during
the implementation of XIA, which is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Linux XIA
In order to substantiate the claim that XIA is a viable meta architecture, we needed a
full-blown network stack to accommodate the implementations of other architectures.
Furthermore, a native implementation providing competitive routing performance is
a necessary step to show that XIA is deployable in production network environments.
At a block-diagram level, Figure 3·1 depicts TCP/IP and XIA as parallel stacks
in the Linux kernel. In the figure, the matching colors guide the analogy between
the stacks: IP maps to XIP, TCP to Serval, and UDP to XDP. Although the figure
suggests that TCP, UDP, and IP are individual kernel modules, in practice, the
TCP/IP stack is largely implemented as a single monolithic module in Linux. In
contrast, each block on the XIA side corresponds to a distinct Linux kernel module
that we implemented. In this chapter, we focus on the realization of XIP and the
implementation of core XIA principals like HID and AD1. Later, when we integrate
alien designs with XIA, we describe the realization of 4ID to provide interoperability
with IP, and describe our implementation of Serval. These appear in Sections 4.1
and 4.2 respectively. Principal XDP (eXpressive Datagram Principal) is not discussed
further; it is just a variation of UDP.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: we discuss the impact that
1 Note that the boxes for these principals are not contiguous to the POSIX Socket API because
one cannot create sockets to directly drive them; one can only use these principals to compose XIP
addresses.
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our experience developing Linux XIA had on our architectural design (Section 3.1),
cover the internals of how Linux XIA forwards packets (Section 3.2), and describe
how Linux XIA keeps its forwarding cache synchronized with its routing table (Sec-
tion 3.3).
3.1 Influences from our experience
Designing Linux XIA from scratch gave us many opportunities to explore and to avoid
barriers to future evolution of our network stack, a central architectural premise of
our work. Working from this first principle led us to a radically different design than
that of the native TCP/IP stack. We report on experiences that reinforce the power
of modular design, alert us to the dangers of hard-wiring to companion protocols such
as ARP and ICMP, and clarify how new principals must themselves be architected
for evolvability.
The first influential decision we made during the implementation of Linux XIA
was to map each principal to a kernel module. This decision, premised on modular
design2, ended up interacting with XIA in unexpected ways: it led us to (1) make
XIP a truly standalone protocol, in contrast to IP which needs ARP and ICMP to
operate, (2) define a simple path for evolving already-deployed principals, and (3)
conceive of routing redirects, a facility for supporting runtime dependencies between
principals.
In the influential design of TCP/IP, ARP3 serves the key role of mapping network
2Our original motivation was the fear of losing control of the codebase since it was growing
fast, and would need to welcome much more code as other principals joined the stack; according to
sloccount (Wheeler, 2004), the kernel part of our codebase alone has 17,669 lines of code. Supporting
static independence among principals required considerable extra work, but it gave us a strong grip
on the overall codebase.
3 ARP (Plummer, 1982) was originally designed as an interface between IPv4 and Ethernet, but
the protocol has evolved into a companion for IPv4 to interface with other link technologies. This
companion status has been endorsed and extended in IPv6 in the form of the Neighbor Discovery
protocol (Narten et al., 2007). In spite of the fact that one can redesign IPv4 to externalize ARP,
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Figure 3·1: Overview of the TCP/IP and XIA stacks in the Linux
kernel.
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address to hardware addresses, and is a distinct protocol coexisting with IP at the
narrow waist of the stack. But as we have seen, such an undesirable static depen-
dency can hinder evolution, and we wondered, does the analogous protocol for XIA
necessitate the same design? We found that, in part due to the componentized imple-
mentation of Linux XIA, retaining such a dependency (by inertia) is overly restrictive
and unnecessary. Indeed, since ARP specifically relates to hosts, we identified that the
most natural fit was to integrate its XIA replacement with the HID principal, and not
with XIP itself. To do so, we implemented an analogue of ARP in Linux XIA as part
of the HID principal, which we refer to as the Neighborhood Watch Protocol (NWP).
Although ARP and NWP serve equivalent purposes, they accomplish them through
distinct mechanisms. NWP tracks neighbors and synchronizes state among them like
ARP, but also leverages intrinsic security of HID identifiers to avoid problems such
as ARP poisoning (a full description of NWP’s internals is outside the scope of this
dissertation because it digresses from our thesis statement). Ultimately, while NWP
and HID must co-evolve, an entanglement which we view as potentially unavoidable,
moving ARP functionality out of the network layer frees up additional constraints on
XIP. Similarly to the ARP case, we have pushed the analogue of ICMP out of the
network layer and into a principal, making XIP truly a standalone protocol.
Having principals as kernel modules helps evolution of already-deployed princi-
pals. For example, suppose that a new version of HID principal, namely HIDv2,
with an enhanced, but not backwards compatible, version of NWP is released. One
could gradually deploy HIDv2 in XIA routers and hosts, make necessary configura-
tion adjustments in the network to move from HIDv1 to HIDv2, and, once HIDv1 is
no longer necessary, drop HIDv1 from XIA routers and hosts. In the same vein, but
more concretely, we detail a four-step transition plan for XIA to move away from,
ARP effectively acts as an extension of IPv4. Further evidence of this state of affairs is that, even
in virtual environments in which the whole network is virtualized and all information that ARP
gathers is already available in virtual switches and hypervisors, ARP is still used.
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and ultimately off of, IP in Section 4.1.
As long as there are no static dependencies among kernel modules of principals,
each XIA router or host can load any set of principals into the stack. This feature
avoids biasing stakeholders toward principals that the implementation arbitrarily re-
quires. Even an empty set of principals is a valid configuration in Linux XIA, although
obviously an impractical one.
Although static dependencies are problematic, runtime dependencies among prin-
cipals emerge as a useful technique to avoid duplicating code. For example, instead
of reimplementing much of what the HID principal does in the AD principal, given
that the latter also needs to forward packets to neighbors, writers of the AD prin-
cipal may be tempted to call internal functions of HIDs to deal with it. This in
turn, would effectively link AD’s implementation to a specific version of HID. Avoid-
ing these undesirable static dependencies among principals required an enhancement
of XIA’s routing algorithm, namely routing redirects, that lets stakeholders express
dependencies among principals they select in runtime. Details of this approach, as
embodied in Linux XIA’s routing mechanism, are described next.
3.2 Forwarding packets
Although an XIA router may have to inspect up to four XIDs, the maximum fanout
in an XIP address, to make a routing decision, one does not have to serialize those
lookups. This section explains how Linux XIA instantiates XIA’s forwarding mech-
anism without hardware optimizations. Subsequently, in Chapter 5, we present our
performance evaluation of this machinery against the Linux IP implementation.
A diagram of the XIA routing algorithm is presented in Figure 3·2. When a
packet arrives on an incoming interface, Linux XIA’s routing fast path references the
LastNode field of the packet to obtain the sequence (in priority order) of outbound
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Figure 3·2: Linux XIA’s routing algorithm.
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edges from that node in the destination address. It then hashes this entire sequence
of XIDs to look up in its routing cache, which is called a DST table4. If there is a
cache hit, the DST table returns a DST entry, a data structure that holds multiple
pointers to functions that forward packets with the same signature sequence of edges.
The multiple function pointers in a DST entry deal with different moments of the life
cycle of a packet.
Otherwise, on a DST cache miss, Linux XIA falls back to its routing slow path.
Now, Linux XIA iteratively looks up the candidate edges in the routing table. One can
do these lookups in parallel, but, without hardware support, a software-only solution
cannot take advantage of this opportunity due to the high cost of synchronizing the
results. The iterator terminates either with all edges of LastNode generating misses
in the routing table (unreachable destination), or when one of the edges is hit. In
both cases, a new DST entry for this sequence of edges is created, added to the DST
table, and returned.
While the machinery described so far is sufficient to implement the XIA rout-
ing algorithm as originally specified (Section 2.3.3), does it also achieve our goal of
principal independence? As the example below indicates, it does not. Therefore, we
introduced the concept of routing redirects. A routing redirect takes place when the
iterator in Figure 3·2 looks up an XID and the routing table returns a “miss”, in
which case another XID is to be looked up in order to satisfy the first lookup. This
simple solution replaces static dependencies among principals with runtime depen-
dencies. Continuing the example of the previous section in which AD was tempted
to call HID’s code, instead, the AD principal just redirects its XIDs that need to
be forwarded to a neighbor returning HID XIDs to the iterator, which, in turn, will
delegate the work to HID principal; Figure 3·3 illustrates some examples of routing
4Linux’s DST subsystem is a code infrastructure that binds queues, network devices, and network-
layer routing. The name DST is derived from “destination cache”.
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redirects. Routing redirects have matured beyond our goal of breaking static depen-
dencies, and have found their way into routing protocols we have been exploring as
well as a flexible mechanism to split functionality among principals.
The routing algorithm explained above has two challenges to overcome: (1) keep-
ing the routing cache synchronized to the routing table, and (2) working efficiently
under a memory limit at the DST table.
The first challenge deals with the fact the routing table and the DST table are two
independent data structures that deal with non-overlapping constraints. For example,
the DST table is read and written in atomic context5, whereas the routing table is
written in process context. The challenge is not only limited to an operating system
technicality; changes to the routing table can affect the DST table in non-obvious
ways. For example, even without accounting for routing redirects, finding the DST
entries that become invalid when an XID is added to the routing table may require
a full scan of the DST table, since adding an XID to the routing table invalidates
all DST entries that prioritize this XID at a higher priority than their currently
chosen edge. We provide a solution to this challenge, based on fast data structures
for maintaining forests of dependencies, in the next section.
The second challenge is that of working under stress, or under attack. For example,
an adversary could mount a denial-of-service attack in which undeliverable packets
are sent to an XIA router each with a unique edge sequence signature. These useless
entries would require lookups on the slow path and put pressure on the DST table
to potentially drop useful entries. A proper solution for this problem is still to be
investigated. The current implementation employs simple heuristics to reclaim entries
based on frequency and recency in order to maximize the usefulness of entries.
5Execution context that is not associated to a process, so it cannot block. For example, inter-
ruptions, bottom halves, and non-preemptable locks.
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3.3 Routing dependencies
Only an effective mechanism to keep the routing table and routing cache6 synchro-
nized realizes the gains that the routing cache brings to Linux XIA’s routing algo-
rithm. Our solution consists in incrementally building dependency chains for each
edge queried during the routing slow path and anchoring these chains on the entries
that keep them fresh. Although developed independently, our solution is a variation
of the Data Update Propagation algorithm originally devised for keeping caches of
dynamic web pages consistent with underlying data (Challenger et al., 1999). First,
we argue that naive solutions such as flushing the routing cache whenever the routing
table is updated, or periodically scanning the whole routing cache to identify stale
entries are not effective. Nevertheless, the shortcomings of naive solutions are instruc-
tive for introducing the domain of the problem. Second, we present our solution, and
conclude with a root classification that helps reasoning about the data structure.
Flushing the DST table every time the routing table is updated causes routing
hiccups; suddenly the DST table is empty and all packets have to be analyzed on the
slow path, one edge at a time. XIA principals that have their XIDs associated with
sockets or other userland objects (e.g. Serval services) may see an update rate of their
part of the routing table high enough to render the DST table a useless burden.
Scanning the DST table for XIDs to be added to or removed from the routing
table, to avoid flushing all DST entries, is demanding. Unless the DST table takes
a small amount of memory, scanning the DST table puts pressure on a machine’s
memory cache subsystem due to the rotation of cached memory pages before reusing
them. Moreover, unless the number of stale DST entries is a large proportion of
the entries in the table, the scan itself is inherently inefficient. On top of that, the
freshness test of a DST entry after the addition or removal of a given XID to the
6Just another designation for the DST table.
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routing table is not a simple string comparison between the edges that the DST entry
represents and this XID. For example, consider a principal that supports a default
route when all its other routes are not applicable (e.g. principal AD); the default
route does not have an XID. A special XID representing the default route does not
help because it will not be seen in the edges of a DST entry. Moreover, the cost of the
freshness test of DST entries grows rather quickly in the presence of routing redirects.
The problem of the first naive solution is the lack of any identification of the entries
that have to be flushed, whereas the second naive solution pays a high cost to identify
these entries. Our solution addresses both problems at once leveraging the routing
slow path to incrementally build dependency chains for each edge investigated. These
chains enumerate everything that keeps a DST entry fresh. Given that these chains
eventually merge with each other, one should talk about a dependency forest—every
node but the leaves of this forest are called anchors. When an anchor goes away,
all of its dependencies, or equivalently, the entire subtree of the forest rooted at this
anchor, must be flushed. Figure 3·3 illustrates a small dependency forest and its
related routing table and DST entries.
While reasoning about and implementing routing dependencies, we have found
it useful to classify root anchors as positive, or negative. Positive root anchors are
existing entries in the routing table, whereas negative root anchors7 are nonexisting
entries. Nonexisting entries may come from known or unknown principals; a principal
becoming known when the corresponding kernel module for that principal is loaded
into memory. Each edge of a DST entry is classified and signed according to the
sign of the root anchor it reaches. Combining these classifications and the routing
slow path, one derives simple properties that help reasoning about the whole routing
mechanism such as:
7This expression was inspired by negative cache, a cache of negative responses, i.e. failures.
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Figure 3·3: Example of routing-dependency linkage between routing
table entries and DST entries in Linux XIA. DST dependencies (signed
edges) form a rooted forest anchored at routing table entries (positive
anchors) and non-entries (negative anchors). Only root anchors’ and
DST entries’ edges are classified as positive, or negative.
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• DST entries have either zero or one single positive edge; otherwise there would
be more than one chosen edge.
• DST entries have from zero to four negative anchors, as four is the maximum
fanout of a node.
• Negative edges are always evaluated before a positive edge if the latter exists.
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Chapter 4
Porting alien designs to XIA
This chapter explains how four distinct network designs never intended for compati-
bility with XIA can be adapted to work and coexist in XIA. It is meant to demonstrate
the value of an interoperable meta architecture and to provide other researchers with
instructive examples on how to adapt their own designs, or design for XIA from
scratch.
In porting a network design Y to XIA, we have found that two questions drive
most of the work: how can Y’s visible identifiers be mapped to XIDs, and how can
Y be broken into principals? Whereas the first question is simple and inevitable, it
is not always obvious a priori which of the many possible options will prove to be
the best one. In fact, experience with promising options may be required to make a
meaningful selection, noting that one implemented interpretation of a network design
in XIA does not inhibit other interpretations of the same design in any way. Since
many interpretations of a single design can naturally coexist in Linux XIA, value
judgments are ultimately left to the stakeholders of an XIA network.
The second question adds more subtlety, as it focuses on exploring interpreta-
tions of a given design typically not considered in the original design, where the focus
is self-sufficiency, not interoperability. XIA’s composition of different principals to
form a single address affords principals the opportunity of specializing their behavior,
and delegating functions to other principals. The first and second porting questions
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respectively derive from our principal and architecture definitions introduced in Sec-
tion 1.1.
Section 4.1 provides a starting point, by showing how XIA can support a legacy
technology, specifically focusing on how XIP and IP can coexist and interoperate.
Then, Section 4.2 describes our port of Serval (Nordstro¨m et al., 2012), a service-
centric architecture. Section 4.3 presents a whitepaper design of NDN (Jacobson
et al., 2009), a content-centric architecture, for XIA. Finally, Section 4.4 maps ANTS
(Wetherall, 1999), an active meta architecture, onto XIA.
4.1 Case study #1: IP
Any new Internet architecture has to furnish a friendly coexistence with IP networks
in order to be deployable. A widely used approach for introducing new functionality
onto legacy networks, which we also adopt, makes use of (IP) encapsulation. In this
section, we describe a set of XIA principals, called 4IDs (respectively, 6IDs), that allow
XIA-enabled hosts to communicate over a legacy IPv4 (respectively, IPv6) network.
A key finding, not obvious to us a priori, is that different degrees of integration and
interaction with IP networks are suited to multiple 4ID and 6ID principal types,
designed to satisfy different stakeholders’ needs.
Given that there will be no support for XIA in the open Internet during the
early deployment of XIA, any integration must focus on retroactive compatibility;
this motivation drives the design of the U4ID principal. U4ID XIDs’ names1 are the
tuple (IP address, port number) followed by 14 zeros to make up the required 20-byte
names. To forward to a U4ID in an address, XIA encapsulates its XIP packet into the
payload of an IP/UDP packet whose destination IP address and UDP port number
are copied from the XID; from there, the TCP/IP stack delivers this new packet. The
1Recall from Section 1.3 that an XID is the pairing of a principal type and a name.
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XIA stack of the destination host must have principal U4ID running and listening
at the UDP port number in order to receive the packet. After IP and UDP header
decapsulation, the payload XIP packet is transferred to the XIA stack.
Stakeholders operating controlled environments (e.g. datacenters, campuses, cor-
porations) may prefer to trade in some compatibility for performance. Principal I4ID
achieves this by encapsulating XIP packets into the payload of an IP packet and writ-
ing XIP into the protocol field of the IP header. In the open Internet, middleboxes
are likely to drop these IP/XIP packets, but, in controlled environments, I4ID would
avoid UDP’s checksum, UDP’s 8-byte header, and port demultiplexing. I4ID XIDs’
names are the destination IP addresses followed by 16 zeros.
Principals U4ID and I4ID build on-the-fly tunnels through IP networks. Although
one needs these tunnels for retroactive compatibility with IP, these tunnels are limiting
because the edges of the destination address of the encapsulated XIP packet are only
evaluated at the end of the tunnel; even when all intermediate routers are XIA-
enabled. In a later stage of deployment of XIA, where a large number of hosts have
TCP/IP and XIA stacks to support both legacy IP applications and XIA applications,
the limitations of tunnels become salient.
Designed for a dual-stack environment, principal X4ID leverages IP’s routing table
to forward its XIDs, thereby avoiding tunnelling. X4IDs have the same trailing-zero
format as I4IDs; the distinction between these principals is the forwarding mechanism.
Routers forwards X4IDs by directly looking up the corresponding IP address in the
routing table of TCP/IP stack. Principal X4ID is the tightest integration between
TCP/IP and XIA stacks, and can bridge the deployment of XIA at Internet scale
because it leverages the current BGP sessions to globally forward XIP packets.
To go further, we recommend the introduction of a general-purpose principal,
which we will also use in Serval. The motivation is that, in contrast to opaque
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cryptographic identifiers typically associated with XIA, identifiers of IP (and Serval)
have a hierarchical structure, and, in particular, are designed to support longest prefix
matching. To support this functionality in XIA we designed a simple LPM principal
to support longest prefix matching on the underlying identifiers. With this, an LPM
XID is a typed string of bits that XIA routers match against a prefix tree at each
hop, analogous to CIDR.
Returning to 4IDs, while principal X4ID is a perfect fit for dual stack hosts, it
nevertheless perpetuates an undesirable dependency on IP’s routing tables for XIA-
only hosts that simply want to tap into the BGP sessions. These stakeholders can
drop the dependence on IP’s routing tables by using the LPM principal and directly
populating the LPM forwarding table with routes from BGP sessions, achieving the
same behavior as principal X4ID, but without the need for a TCP/IP stack. This
solution is similar in nature to how MPLS uses BGP to populate its forwarding
tables. We expect that a protocol that leverages intrinsically secure identifiers would
eventually replace the use of X4ID and LPM for this purpose; nevertheless, X4ID and
LPM offer an easy deployment path to bootstrap global interoperability for XIA.
A natural deployment plan for Linux XIA is to run natively wherever possible
and to interconnect XIA networks through an IP-only Internet with the help of 4IDs,
6IDs, and LPM principals as long as necessary. We have implemented the first step
of our migration plan, namely, principal U4ID in Linux XIA. Mukerjee et al. (Muk-
erjee et al., 2013) have explored the advantages of incrementally deploying XIA with
the help of U4ID or I4ID principals. Our principals X4ID and LPM complement
their work in the scenario they call “merged clouds”, in which dual-stack hosts are
commonplace.
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4.2 (In-depth) case study #2: Serval
Serval, a service-centric architecture, promotes services as first-class entities, as de-
scribed in detail in prior work (Nordstro¨m et al., 2012; Arye et al., 2012). The main
goals of Serval are threefold: support replicated instances of a single service, support
multihomed access to services, and allow for mobility at the connection endpoints.
These goals are implemented through three respective methods: host-agnostic late
binding to servers, tightly integrated support for multiple flows per connections, and
a formally-verified migration protocol. Given that Serval’s connection handshake ex-
poses much of its internals and provides a good working view of its design, we present
Serval and its realization in XIA from this angle.
A key enabling technology is Serval’s use of two distinct types of identifiers, Ser-
valID2 and FlowID, both deployed in a shim layer called the Service Access Layer
(SAL) which resides between the network layer and the transport layer in the protocol
stack. ServalIDs logically represent a distinct service, such as an HTTP connection
to www.example.com, but due to service replication, do not necessarily refer to a
unique location. ServalIDs have a hierarchical meaning in Serval, and thus they are
routed using longest prefix matching, like IP addresses. Unlike ServalIDs, which are
used for end-to-end connection establishment and management, FlowIDs are used for
established flows within a service instance. These FlowIDs are flat identifiers and are
only unique with respect to the host that generated it.
Serval uses either the tuple (protocol, destination ServalID), or (protocol, desti-
nation FlowID) to multiplex connections. The protocol field identifies the transport
protocol above Serval; currently, UDP and TCP are supported. These tuples sim-
plify process migration because they do not bind to remote identifiers, in contrast
with TCP and UDP, which use the 5-tuple (protocol, source IP address, source port
2The original Serval paper refers to this as a ServiceID, but we renamed it to avoid ambiguity
with XIA’s ServiceID.
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Figure 4·1: Example of Serval’s three-way connection handshake be-
tween a client on host a and a service instance on e.
number, destination IP address, destination port number) to multiplex connections.
Serval’s connection handshake closely resembles TCP’s three-way handshake. Fig-
ure 4·1 summarizes the process for an application connecting to service ServalID1,
which has two instances available in the datacenter at right. Machines a, b, d, e are
both Serval and IP enabled, while machine c is a legacy IP router. The handshake
starts with a SYN packet destined to ServalID1. This packet also carries a pro-
posed FlowID for the connection from a as the SAL source address. In Step 1, Serval
looks up ServalID1 in its service table, resolves ServalID1 to host b, and rewrites
the IP and SAL headers accordingly before forwarding. Once the packet arrives at
Service Router b (Step 2), b has a forwarding decision to make, and, for example, can
route ServalID1 either to host d or e depending on its local load-balancing policy.
Here, b rewrites the SAL layer header and the IP header with the chosen destination,
e. When the SYN packet reaches host e, Serval resolves ServalID1 to the listening
socket (Step 3), which replies with a SYN-ACK packet (Step 4). This SYN-ACK
acknowledges a’s FlowID, and establishes a FlowID from e. On the return path of
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the SYN-ACK (Step 5), the ACK completing the three-way handshake (Step 6), and
all subsequent packets for this flow, are forwarded using legacy IP.
We briefly remark on security considerations in Serval. In the original design,
ServalIDs lack intrinsic security, that is, connection endpoints cannot verify each
other’s identity without a third party. To improve security, the Serval design uses a
nonce field that serves as a shared password between connection endpoints to mitigate
off-path attacks, but this cannot prevent on-path attacks.
4.2.1 Mapping Serval to XIA
Recall that a central challenge of mapping an alien technology onto XIA is an ap-
propriate principal decomposition. We start with naming of services. In Serval, the
use of ServalID corresponds naturally to the role of a new XID type in XIA: it is
globally scoped, has a well-defined meaning that corresponds to a user intent, and
is routable. While Serval’s authors chose to make ServalID a hierarchical identifier
to ensure global routing, our preferred specification is to use flat identifiers imbued
with cryptographic meaning. Our disentangling of the two distinct roles of Ser-
valIDs, naming services and facilitating routing, makes ServalIDs intrinsically secure
in XIA. Thus, in our interpretation of Serval, ServalIDs are the hash of their public
key, and scoping is left to other principals to deal with. For example, the address
• → AD1 → HID1 → ServalID1 scopes ServalID1 to host HID1 located in the
autonomous domain AD1.
As for FlowIDs, these local identifiers are not germane to XIP forwarding, and
thus comprise a local XID principal type that is used exclusively at endpoints. We
retain the semantics of this field as used in the original Serval and thus, when in use,
it is specified as the primary intent in a destination address, but is always scoped
to a given host. Conceptually, we can think of FlowIDs as a companion principal to
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Figure 4·2: Example of XIA Serval’s three-way connection handshake
between a client and a service instance.
ServalIDs, which together comprise a composite XIA principal which we jointly refer
to as the Serval principal.
Finally, note that our preference toward intrinsically secure ServalIDs does not
preclude a fallback to hierarchical identifiers. One solution would be to have another
interpretation of Serval in XIA that preserved ServalIDs’ hierarchical behavior. But
a more modular solution, more in tune with the question how to break Serval into
principals, suggests the use of LPM, described in the context of IP, to do the longest
prefix matching on its identifiers. Using LPM, Serval’s original behavior is fully
emulated with addresses such as
LPM1 ServalID1
We can now quickly review connection establishment in the context of XIA Serval.
Figure 4·2 diagrams the packet sequencing, analogous to that depicted in Figure 4·1.
The packet sequencing is identical, with the main distinction being provided in the
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address formats. In packets where ServalIDs were used as destination addresses in
the SAL layer (packets 1-5), those are mapped to XIA destination addresses with
XIA ServalIDs as the sink (optionally falling back to LPM XIDs). In packets where
FlowIDs were used as the destination (packet 6), those are mapped to XIA destination
addresses with XIA FlowIDs as the sink, but always scoped to HIDs.3 Similarly, when
FlowIDs were used as the source address (all packets), those are also mapped to host-
scoped FlowIDs. The exception is packet 1. Here, the Serval implementation uses a
FlowID as the source, but we require instantiation of a ServalID at both endpoints,
and obtain the proposed FlowID from the ACK packet. We find that this small
change simplifies connection management, such as migrating a connection endpoint,
or adding another path to the connection. More critically, it preserves end-to-end
security guarantees, as ServalIDs have a cryptographic meaning, whereas FlowIDs
do not. Finally, all subsequent traffic would use FlowID1 and FlowID2 as sink
addresses, bypassing the need for today’s on-path load balancers to do packet-by-
packet preservation of IP-based mappings.
4.2.2 Discussion
Integrating Serval with XIA affords several key advantages compared to the origi-
nal implementation over IP. First, elevating Serval addresses stored in the SAL shim
layer to first-class XIA addresses provides much better visibility with respect to user
intent. Whereas Serval carries its identifiers in extension headers above IP, in XIA’s
realization, those identifiers are carried in XIA’s network layer addresses. Thus, while
original Serval can only make forwarding decisions when IP gives it a chance, XIA
Serval enables every router to make decisions purely based on network layer informa-
tion. As a result, placing ServalIDs as the primary intent of connection establishment
3In general, the preferred scope of FlowIDs could include both an HID and an AD; this infor-
mation is available at the host and is either derived from routing daemons, or manually entered by
network administrators.
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enables routers to seamlessly realize service-layer anycast. This possibility of pushing
the instance choice down a path retains Serval’s architectural goal of “late binding”,
in contrast with the “early binding” employed today, e.g., using DNS. Perhaps more
importantly, hardening ServalIDs with the intrinsic security afforded by XIA elimi-
nates the possibility of spoofed services, and renders Serval’s (weaker) methods for
prevention of off-path attacks unnecessary. This is exemplified in the source address
used in SYN packets: whereas Serval can take an easy shortcut of inserting a FlowID-
based address, the XIA approach enforces the use of a secure ServalID-based address
to initiate the communication. Note that this bootstrapping procedure could also
be used to harden all subsequent transmissions with cryptographic signing, including
the FlowIDs themselves.
As a final remark, we have sucessfully ported Serval onto Linux XIA as described
in this section. Serval’s codebase is publically available on GitHub (Princeton SNS
Group, 2012).
4.3 Case study #3: NDN
NDN (Jacobson et al., 2009), a content-centric architecture, embodies a design that
is difficult to instantiate on meta architectures without losing some of its features.
Although prior work has sketched how to port generic information-centric network-
ing (ICN) concepts onto translating meta architectures (see, e.g. (Raghavan et al.,
2012b)), porting specific features of NDN appears more challenging. These include re-
taining the anonymity implications associated with the absence of source addresses,
deduplicating interest and data packets across regions, and realizing scalable mul-
ticast. These features all rely on the Pending Interest Table, a core component
of NDN. Leaving out those features implies not supporting protocols that leverage
NDN internals, such as ChronoSync (Zhu and Afanasyev, 2013), a distributed pro-
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tocol to synchronize dataset state among multiple parties in NDN. We now present
two whitepaper designs of how to port NDN to XIA. The first alternative faithfully
retains all of NDN’s features, whereas the second forgoes support for dynamic content
but eliminates the need for public-key management.
NDN abstracts a network as an infrastructure that stores and retrieves content
as named data within a hierarchical name system. The name structure is analo-
gous to the one found in a POSIX file system, that is, a sequence of independent
names that describe a path from the root of the hierarchical tree toward one of the
leaves. Communication proceeds as follows: an application sends an interest packet
into the network, each NDN router does a longest-prefix lookup on the name of the
content, and performs an action based on the matched rule. These actions take care
of forwarding interest packets, replying to interest packets with data packets storing
content, and tracking the inbound interface(s) on which each interest packet arrives
in order to forward back data packets.
The first challenge in porting NDN to XIA is to find a suitable XID format. The
naive approach of embedding NDN names into an XID hits the issue that NDN names
can be potentially larger than 20 bytes, the space reserved for an XID identifier. To
the best of our knowledge, the NDN project has not committed to a limit for the length
of its identifiers, but some limit is necessary; otherwise, a frame with an NDN packet
may not have space to accommodate the name of the content that it is interested in
(interest packets) or that it carries (data packets). We consider two possibilities for
NDN XIDs: (1) the hash of the content name, and (2) the hash of the content.
Having the hash of content names as XIDs closely approximates original NDN.
The NDN header, which comes above the XIP header, carries the full name of the
content. Thus, XIP caches routing decisions for NDN XIDs, and, whenever a non-
cached XID is requested, XIP transfers control to the NDN principal that, then,
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looks into the NDN header, runs the NDN routing algorithm as is, and returns its
routing decision to XIP. This solution reuses virtually every design made for NDN
with minimal changes.
Interestingly, the lack of source addresses in NDN interacts with other principals
in a non-straightforward way, raising interoperability challenges. An interest packet
destined to • → NDN1 would work as expected, that is, it queries the network
for content NDN1, and has no source address. The difficulty comes into play with
addresses that scope an NDN XID such as • → AD1 → NDN14. This address
forces an interest packet to be forwarded to a router in the autonomous domain AD1,
and, from there, follows NDN1. When the data packet flows back on the return
path, it will stop at that router in AD1, not at the anonymous source of the interest
packet. One solution is to add a suitable source address to those interest packets,
but this spotlights that having the hash of content names as NDN XIDs leads to a
different way of thinking about source addresses in XIA. As examples in Section 4.2.1
expose, source addresses in XIA are almost independent of destination addresses.
The different NDN source addresses stem from names being used to name content
and route interest and data packets.
We now consider the second alternative for porting NDN to XIA, namely, having
the hash of a content as its XID. Dynamic content is no longer possible in this
alternative because the hash of the content would have to be known prior to sending
an interest packet. Nevertheless, this alternative eliminates the need for public-key
management to secure content in the original NDN approach (Smetters and Jacobson,
2009), because now identifiers are intrinsically secure. Moreover, since this alternative
can rely on other principals to route interest and data packets, its source addresses
are not different from other source addresses used in XIA. This second alternative
4Such an address has no analogue in NDN, but is admissible in XIA. One relevant use case for
scoped NDN XIDs is in the context of network troubleshooting.
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for porting NDN to XIA is comparable to the CID principal in XIA (Chapter 2).
Considering that a principal such as Serval can take on the responsibility of handling
dynamic content, the CID principal offers a pathway to break down NDN into many
principals, and exposes the tradeoff between supporting dynamic content and public-
key management in NDN.
Porting NDN to XIA enables the community to explore the design space of
content-centric architectures, which improves our understanding of the tradeoffs,
draws value to each alternative, and may lead to new designs. In addition, this
port frees NDN to focus on the features that bring the most value to its design. For
example, NDN does not export location abstractions to its applications, which in turn
forces NDN to accommodate special-purpose solutions to enable network operators
to troubleshoot NDN networks. In XIA, NDN can delegate this chore to appropriate
principals.
4.4 Case study #4: ANTS
Given that ANTS is a meta network architecture, one can expect that ANTS and
XIA share some common ground, yet, as we show in the following subsection, their
relationship goes deeper. This relationship encompasses motivation, some solutions,
and a formal, surprising relation between their set of supported principals. Using
XIA’s lexicon, this section presents ANTS (Wetherall, 1999), shows a whitepaper
design of how to port ANTS to XIA, and points out that the reverse is not possible,
which, in turn, demonstrates that XIA supports a superset of the principals that
ANTS can support.
ANTS and XIA share motivation and solutions, but they have addressed different
challenges. The motivation for ANTS, lowering the barriers to evolve the network
layer, is just another way to motivate XIA. Solutions such as intrinsic security for
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identifiers, a fallback behavior on routers that do not support ANTS, and a principal
definition close to ours emphasize the similarity of the problem space of both meta
architectures. The addressed challenges have been different due to a key goal of
ANTS: supporting mobile code to define new principals, which required a significant
amount of effort to design a code distribution protocol, define a suitable running
environment for this mobile code, and deal with security issues related to mobile
code.
Our port of ANTS sidesteps security issues related to code mobility as well as
code distribution to focus on the fundamental porting questions. This is not to say
that an XIA version of ANTS can do without these two items, but rather that we do
not attempt to improve on the ANTS solution. However, we depart from ANTS’ use
of Java in favor of Lua (Ierusalimschy et al., 2013) for mobile code. Our rationale is
that while ANTS was originally designed to run in user space, the XIA realization of
ANTS runs in kernel space, and a lightweight, easily-embedded language simplifies
this move.
Different from our previous case studies, the choice of XID format for ANTS is a
natural one. ANTS packets, called capsules, have a type field that describes how they
are forwarded. In ANTS, the type field is a cryptographic hash of the forwarding code
that should be applied to packets of this type. Specifically, the hash is a hash of the
nodes on the root-to-leaf path of the Merkle tree whose leaves are the blocks of code
that define the behavior of an ANTS principal. ANTS uses this Merkle tree to verify
that the mobile code that routers exchange among themselves is the one to which
the type field maps. Merkle trees are especially convenient here because they enable
routers to transfer and verify only the code blocks needed to forward the capsules in
hand. In XIA, this type field is ideally suited to be the XID of the ANTS principal
since it is already intrinsically secure. In fact, ANTS is, to the best of our knowledge,
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the first work to use intrinsic security on network identifiers. Nevertheless, intrinsic
security is not pervasive in ANTS; no other class of identifiers in ANTS is defined
intrinsically securely.
When a capsule reaches a router that supports ANTS, the router calls the for-
warding routine associated with the ANTS XID to make the routing decision. If the
routine associated is not available locally, the processing of the capsule is postponed
until the necessary mobile code is obtained through the code distribution protocol.
If the router does not support ANTS, the router forwards the capsule as a regular
IP packet since ANTS stacks its headers above the IP header. The XIA version
of ANTS naturally relies on fallback edges to deal with routers that do not support
ANTS principals, while giving ANTS highest priority, as in the following XIA address.
AD1 HID1 ANTS1
Although the address above matches the description of the iterative refinement pat-
tern defined in Section 2.3.2, the semantics here are not necessarily the same; they
depend upon the decisions of the corresponding ANTS forwarding code. The following
example illustrates the difference: a capsule arrives at a router that supports ANTS
and XIP’s LastNode field points to AD1. In this case, ANTS1 will be executed, but
might choose to inform XIP that its edge cannot be followed, which would force XIP
to follow the edge to HID1. In contrast, the iterative refinement pattern prescribes
that XIP would always follow the edge to ANTS1 since ANTS1 is locally available.
ANTS fits well in XIA as a single principal type. Due to its reliance on IP
to forward packets as an incremental deployment strategy, ANTS is not a network
architecture without IP. The XIA version of ANTS removes this dependency by dele-
gating the scoping of ANTS XIDs to XIA principals such as AD, HID, and 4IDs. At
the same time, ANTS both supports a broad spectrum of factors and does not impose
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any static dependencies among its supported factors, so ANTS is a meta architecture
according to our classification.
We now show that XIA’s set of principals is a superset of ANTS. While one can
port ANTS to XIA, as shown above, the reverse is not possible due to limitations of the
mobile code runtime environment of ANTS. Specifically, ANTS’ runtime environment
lacks the necessary API calls to implement a reliable transport (Wetherall, 1999,
Section 5.4.2); The designers of ANTS deliberately kept the runtime environment to
a minimum to cope with security, performance, and technical constraints. In contrast,
the port of Serval demonstrates that XIA does not have this limitation.
Among all meta network architectures we have investigated, ANTS is the one most
aligned to XIA. We speculate that had ANTS not pursued mobile code as a central
goal, it would even more closely resemble XIA. While deploying the XIA version
of ANTS in the open Internet is not advisable due to the lack of solutions to curb
security issues related to mobile code, we feel that the ANTS principal could well be
a useful development tool in controlled environments.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
A burning question for a new Internet architecture, never mind for a meta one, is if
it can deliver. This is a complex question that encompasses at least (1) a reason to
deploy the new architecture, (2) a deployment plan, (3) enough features to support
legacy applications, and (4) good forwarding performance. Failing on any of these
items renders a negative answer. This dissertation answers these items for XIA as
follows:
1. The reason to deploy XIA is its evolvability. Nobody can predict future network
demands, so the Internet should not favor one architecture over another.
2. Our deployment plan is to run natively wherever possible and to interconnect
XIA networks through the IP Internet with the help of 4ID principals (Sec-
tion 4.1) for as long as necessary, or indefinitely.
3. Roughly speaking, all IP applications run over TCP and UDP. These protocols
are available in XIA (Figure 3·1), and Chapter 4 shows that there is no reason to
doubt that XIA is capable of embracing any other necessary protocol to satisfy
legacy applications.
4. Packet-forwarding performance is a key performance limit to any packet-switching
network such as IP and XIA. This chapter benchmarks XIA against IP to assess
XIA’s performance.
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Our forwarding performance evaluation consists of simulating an environment
close to that seen by a core router, and measuring the impact of Internet users’
preferences over destinations, packet sizes, different addresses, and update rates of
the routing table on forwarding performance. We benchmark all these measurements
against the mature Linux implementation of IP. Section 5.1 describes our testbed,
and Section 5.2 presents the results.
5.1 The testbed
This section covers three aspects of our experiments necessary to the understanding
of the results presented in the next section: (1) how we simulated the conditions a
core router sees, (2) the software and hardware infrastructure we used, and (3) the
conditions under which we took the measurements.
A core router spends most of its time receiving packets from the links connected
to it, routing these packets to their output links, and then forwarding the packets. A
core router does have other activities such as maintaining its routing table, enforcing
network policies, and collecting statistics, but these are supporting activities; they are
not meant to take a significant portion of the computational resources. We abstract
the other side of the ports of a core router to a packet writer (PW) and a counter of
how many routed packets come back. Figure 5·1 depicts this simple topology.
The single field of network headers with highest impact on how packets are routed
is the destination address. Some routing features, however, modify how packets are
forwarded based on fields other than the destination address, such as reverse-path
filtering1, quality of service, and multipath routing. We focus on the cost of routing
itself, therefore our experiments simulate a vanilla router.
All PWs choose the destination addresses of IP packets according to a Zipf distri-
1Reverse-path filters check source addresses to enforce that packets come on the same port routers
would choose to forward packets to that destination.
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Figure 5·1: Topology used in our forwarding performance evaluation.
The environment of our simulated core router is abstracted to packet
writers and counters of successfully routed packets.
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bution over all possible destinations, to account for the popularity of the destinations.
We take as all possible destinations the 462,150 CIDR blocks obtained from Route
Views Project (University of Oregon, 2013). At the beginning of each IP experiment,
we populate the routing table with these CIDR blocks, choosing the output port
uniformly at random among the ports available in the experiment, and randomly
choosing the rank of the CIDR blocks, which is shared among all PWs. We leave
both the number of ports and the exponent of the Zipf distribution as parameters of
the experiments.
All XIA experiments only use addresses with AD XIDs. We could have mixed
different principals’ XIDs in the addresses, including those of Chapter 4, but core
routers are most likely to forward on ADs; at least as long as transit-network operators
do not find it valuable to deploy other principals in their networks. Moreover, as the
principals described in Chapters 2 and 4 suggest, most principals’ XIDs are going to
be flat identifiers, like ADs. Therefore, the cost of looking up an AD is representative
of the cost of looking up other principals’ XIDs. We pessimistically map each CIDR
block to a distinct AD XID to produce a worst-case AD routing table and XIP
addresses.
Our experiments use different XIP address formats (Figure 5·2) to assess the
overhead of processing multiple edges. Address formats FB0, FB1, FB2, and FB3
focus on the cost of having multiple choices, whereas format VIA focuses on the
processing-intensive case in which a node of the address is reached. In the specific
case of the VIA format, AD node AD0 is reached when the corresponding packet
arrives at a border router of the autonomous domain that AD0 represents. When a
node is reached, XIA routers must first update the LastNode field of XIP header to
point to the next node in the address before forwarding, and forward accordingly to
the new last node.
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FB0 FB1
AD0 ADa AD0
FB2 VIA
ADa ADb AD0 AD0 AD1
FB3
ADa ADb ADc AD0
Figure 5·2: Address formats used in the evaluation of forwading per-
formance of Linux XIA. ADa, ADb, and ADc are unknown ADs that
force XIP routers to skip their edges, whereas AD0 and AD1 are known
ADs.
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All experiments run in a single machine with the router and PWs isolated by Linux
Containers (LXC) (Linux Community, 2013), a lightweight virtualization technology.
LXC has been used by others to simplify experiments and make them reproducible
(Lantz et al., 2010; Handigol et al., 2012; Cabral et al., 2013), and has helped us to
focus on the cost of routing instead of dealing with distracting I/O overload and hard-
ware features that only favor IP. Although LXC has a number of resource constrainers,
we have not throttled any resource in our experiments. In special, bandwidth on the
virtual links that connect the router and its ports is only bounded by the speed that
the hardware can run the kernel code.
Our brawny evaluation server has two Intel Xeon Processors E5-2690. Each pro-
cessor has 8 cores plus Hyperthreading running at 2.90GHz that share 20MB of cache
on chip, and a memory bank of 192GB registered DDR3 at 1333 MHz with ECC.
All experiments ran with our kernel, which is a fork of Linux 3.11.0-rc7. Our kernel
(Machado, 2013a) and our evaluation code (Machado, 2013b) are publicly available
on GitHub.
Our evaluation metric is the number of succesfully forwarded packets. All evalu-
ation graphics adopt the unit packets per second instead of throughput or goodput
units, such as bytes per second, to abstract the fact that TCP/IP and XIA’s headers
have different lengths. The forwarded packets are counted with the help of ebtables
(Schuymer, 2011) rules that work at the link level and has low measuring overhead.
Our evaluation server can handle IP experiments with up to 10 ports without
hardware saturation, and up to 6 ports for XIA experiments (Figure 5·3). Neverthe-
less, Linux XIA does not scale the number of ports as well as Linux IP does. As a
compromise, we chose to run all other experiments with 4 ports to avoid hardware
saturation for both stacks, have enough room for the extra load that experiments in
Figure 5·5 and 5·6 require, and avoid pushing apart IP and XIA’s numbers without
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Figure 5·3: Impact of the number of ports on performance
Experiments with 4 ports run without saturating our evaluation server. Fixed pa-
rameters: Zipf exponent is 1.0, 256-byte packets, FB0 addresses, and no updates to
the routing table.
adding value.
Each experiment run takes roughly 6 minutes. In order to make each experiment
run independently from each other, our evaluation scripts reboot the server at the
end of each run. The first and last 20 seconds are discarded to account for the
transitional phases that takes place before the experiment reaches steady state, and
during termination before reboot. The remaining 5 minutes are averaged to obtain
the packets per second of that run. Each box in the graphics represents 20 runs of
that same experiment. The middle lines of the boxes represent the median of those
experiments, whereas the box itself spans the second and third quartile of the runs.
The whiskers extend up to 1.5 times the height of the box; any data point beyond
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that limit is plotted separately. Thus, Figure 5·3 alone represents approximately 5
days of wall-clock running time; not accounting for the time to reboot between runs.
Together, we view this set of experiments as a tough stress test of the code.
5.2 The results
In spite of adding dynamically loaded principals, routing redirects, and routing de-
pendencies on top of XIA’s already flexible network addresses, Linux XIA sports
performance results comparable to those of IP in our simulations of a core router.
The results hold even while accounting for different packet sizes, more complex ad-
dresses used in XIA, and high update rates of the routing table. In addition, Linux
XIA’s solution to routing dependencies, the dependency forest, works so well that it
even surpasses IP’s saturation update rate by an order of magnitude.
The distribution of packet addresses, which our simulation treats as Zipfian, is
the factor that shows the most pronounced effect between the XIA and IP routing
algorithms in our experiments (Figure 5·4). Although XIA only approximates IP’s
forwarding performance in the valuable range [0.5, 1.2] of the Zipf exponent, it out-
performs IP below 0.5 and above 1.2. Linux XIA’s worst performance against IP
happens when Zipf exponent is 0.8, in which case XIA’s median packets per sec-
ond is only 42% of that of IP. On the other hand, when the Zipf exponent reaches
1.6, XIA forwards at speeds comparable to IP’s performance running with 10 ports
(Figure 5·3). Still, IP is faster within a more valuable range of the Zipf exponent.
We believe that XIA can do significantly better against IP with more research, since
Linux XIA is at version 1.0, and many improvements have not been explored. We do
not have a proper understanding, at the time of this writing, why Linux XIA shows a
non-monotonic behavior as the Zipf exponent varies. In the remainder of this section,
we conservatively fix the Zipf exponent at 1.0.
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Figure 5·4: Impact of the Zipf exponent on performance. IP has
the upper hand on the valuable range [0.5, 1.2] of the Zipf exponent.
Zipf exponent equal to zero produces the uniform distribution. Fixed
parameters: 4 ports, 256-byte packets, FB0 addresses, and no updates
to the routing table.
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Figure 5·5: Packet size and more complex addresses have a small im-
pact on performance. Addresses FB1, FB2, FB3, and VIA for 64-byte
packets, and FB3 for 128-byte packets are not available because they
do not fit into these small packets. Fixed parameters: Zipf exponent is
1.0, 4 ports, and no updates to the routing table.
Beyond the distribution of addresses, we conduct sensitivity analyses to quantify
the impact of other variables on forwarding performance. Figure 5·5 shows that
packet sizes, and more complex addresses in the XIA case, have a small impact on
performance for both stacks. The advantage of IP over XIA is in accordance with
Figure 5·4 when exponent is 1.0.
We do not yet have adequate justification for the surprising performance of VIA
forwarding shown in Figures 5·5 and 5·6, as it seems no easier to forward VIA packets
than FB0 packets. We expected that VIA would follow FB1 closely, as happened in
the evaluation of XIA prototype (Han et al., 2012, Section 5.1). The most plausible
explanation of what is happening is that the underdeveloped code that reclaims entries
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of the DST table when the latter is overloaded (see discussion at end of Section 3·2)
is trashing valuable DST entries, and the VIA case is somehow avoiding this to
happen. In the current version of Linux XIA, the DST table is a hash table with
a fixed number of 256 buckets, whereas the previous section points out that there
are more than 460,000 possible edge sequences to cache. Although missing a proper
justification for the better performance is vexing, this shows that there is room for
improving Linux XIA’s overall performance, which we will investigate in future work.
The last experiment assesses the effectiveness of our solution, the dependency
forest, to keep the DST table synchronized to the routing table while the latter
changes. Updating efficiency is relevant due to two factors. First, when disruptive
topology changes take place due to hardware failure, traffic engineering, or policy
changes, routers may see a large number of route updates, and any delays on reflecting
those updates implies more dropped packets. The second factor is XIA-specific: we
expect that some principals will show higher update rates than others, for example,
large collections of content may require large numbers of CID updates concurrently.
While the update rate of the routing table for both stacks as well as different
addresses for XIA show low impact on forwarding performance, IP saturates at an
update rate at an order of magnitude lower than XIA (Figure 5·6). Running the
router without PWs, we have found that IP saturates around 60K entries per seconds,
whereas XIA goes all the way to 900K entries per second.
In our experiments, route updates are sent in batch from userland to the kernel
using Route NetLink, Linux’s preferred communication channel to manage its rout-
ing tables. We assume that each CIDR bock for IP, or each AD for XIA, has the
same probability of updating its route, and thus each update is generated uniformly
choosing a destination among all destinations. Each update also uniformly chooses a
new destination port among all available ports.
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Figure 5·6: Impact of updating the routing table on performance.
XIA saturates at a higher update rate of its routing table than IP. IP
is not available at 100K entries per second column because it cannot
keep up with that update rate. Fixed parameters: Zipf exponent is 1.0,
4 ports, and 256-byte packets.
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While our experiments point that Linux XIA may not be ready for prime time,
they do make the case that Linux XIA is already a viable platform for exploration of
network principals. In addition, we have not found an unsurmountable wall holding
us from matching IP’s performance. We believe that the performance gap is rooted
on the fact that Linux XIA is much younger than Linux IP and, as such, has not
been polished as much as Linux IP. Therefore, closing this gap should be a matter
of time of implementing solutions available in the literature (Dobrescu et al., 2009;
Zhou et al., 2013; Han et al., 2010).
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The previous chapters have laid down a detailed presentation of XIA, an interoperable
meta architecture; described Linux XIA, a native implementation of XIA from scratch
in the Linux kernel; demonstrated how one can port alien architectures to XIA as well
as how to design for XIA; and evaluated XIA benchmarking its forward performance
against Linux IP.
XIA is fundamentally different from previous meta architectures. As an inter-
operable meta architecture, XIA (1) shares the whole network among its supported
principals, (2) enables principal composition at every network address, and (3) en-
courages principal designers to postpone dependencies among principals until runtime
through routing redirects. Thanks to these features, XIA principals can delegate func-
tions and responsibilities to other principals, which, in turn, enables XIA principals
to specialize and achieve their functionality with minimal form. Of course, the flex-
ibility of XIA comes at a price, which is the noticeable complexity of its concepts:
applications are responsible for composing their addresses, principal designers may
have to go through a number of design and implementation iterations before they
can field the best design form for their principals, and our current forwarding algo-
rithm shows plenty of room for improvements that are not easy to address due to
the inherent flexibility that it must support. A key novelty is that in XIA, principals
do not have to be self-sufficient, in contrast to previous meta architectures, whose
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network factors were forced to be self-sufficient architectures. Notwithstanding the
lower principal isolation, XIA is highly expressive, as our demonstration that XIA
supports a superset of the principals that ANTS supports substantiates.
Our research has corroborated our view of an interoperable meta architecture
being a catalyst to bring future Internet architectures (FIAs) closer to fruition, and
to empower the community at large to find the future Internet architecture. Finally,
this exploration can start today, since XIA is deployable on current hardware and
can coexist with TCP/IP.
The remainder of this chapter outlines future work (Section 6.1), presents an
interesting alternative view of XIA as a layerless network stack (Section 6.2), and
concludes with our final remarks (Section 6.3).
6.1 Future work
As a new network stack, Linux XIA affords plenty of directions to improve upon,
and to explore the effects of new features on familiar concepts. In this section, we
consider directions that constitute a departure from directions in this dissertation such
as intrinisc security, but others that more directly follow from our study of forwarding
performance. In addition, we consider porting other architectures to keep pushing
the limits of evolution and add value to Linux XIA, evaluating the advantages that a
meta architecture brings to applications, and exploring alternative definitions of the
factors or how to architect for further specialization.
In spite of intrinsic security being around in the literature for a while now, it
is still not part of a typical Internet use case today. Intrinsic security motivates
researchers to revisit beaconing and routing protocols like ARP, OSPF, and BGP.
For example, leveraging intrinsic security present in HID XIDs to identify poisoning
packets, or propagating security properties through peering connections, could lead to
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new solutions and protocols. Another venue to explore intrinsic security is to consider
alternative definitions for XIDs. For example, the XIA version of Serval opened the
door to explore possible alternatives to the intrinsic security that its ServalIDs and
FlowIDs could use, and if they can or should depend on each other.
Compared to all the investment that has been poured into optimizing IP’s forward-
ing performance in the past decades, the routing algorithms presented in sections 3.2
and 3.3 represent just a good start. On the software side, the following questions
point how to move forward: (1) can Linux XIA forward as fast or faster than Linux
IP, (2) is there a locking mechanism that leverages the dependency data structures to
reduce contention while updating the data routing table, and (3) how can we achieve
graceful degradation of routing performance under extreme stress due to an attack
or load above hardware limits? The hardware side offers another set of lines that
we have not explored and is just as interesting: (1) how can Linux XIA take advan-
tage of Network Processors, FPGAs, or GPUs, (2) how can one extend OpenFlow to
speed Linux XIA up, and (3) what can hardware provide to push Linux XIA to its
performance limit?
6.2 Layers vs. factors
After going through the presentation of XIA and the large number of details that
comes with it in the previous chapters, one may not see the forest for the trees. This
section presents a bird’s eye view of TCP/IP and XIA architectures1 through the key
abstractions that modularize these architectures. This angle is motivated by Bar-
bara Liskov’s insight on the relationship between modularity and abstraction (Liskov,
2009): “modularity based on abstraction is the way things are done”.
The TCP/IP architecture has been modularized into layers2. In fact, the layer
1We are assuming here any instance of XIA with a set of factors that makes it an architecture.
2 We borrow the link between Barbara Liskov’s insight and layers as the abstraction of the data
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abstraction is as old as computer networks, and many network architectures have
embraced this abstraction to simplify reasoning and implementation. Layers estab-
lish clear functional interfaces that enable evolution within each layer as long as new
protocols satisfy the interfaces. The layer abstraction has such deep roots into net-
work stacks that few researchers have questioned its adequacy (Braden et al., 2003).
Moreover, according to the surprising claim of the EvoArch model (Akhshabi and
Dovrolis, 2011), evolving layered protocol stacks may be the sole cause of hourglass-
shaped architectures and network layer stagnation.
It is the factor abstraction that enables meta architectures to evolve. Thanks to
its lower isolation of factors (via specialization and interoperability of XIA principals),
XIA goes a step further towards dropping the layer abstraction. The fact that XIA
does not employ the layer abstraction may not be self-evident due to the impression
that factors are above XIP, and XIP is depicted above the link layer in Figure 3·1.
While the next paragraphs explain this alternative point of view further, we point out
that Figure 3·1 is not in disagreement since it depicts our codebase and its boundaries,
not necessarily layers.
Yet XIP is not a layer, but only a protocol that glues XIA principals together
through its use of expressive addresses. If XIP were a layer, it would not be clear what
abstraction it would export to the above layers. For example, TCP/IP’s layers export
reliable or unreliable transports, best-effort packet delivery, and physical transfer of
frames.
The link layer is a factor whose identifiers are hardware addresses. This view
of the link layer as a factor is easy to implement3. Consider an Ethernet factor
whose XIDs are the numerical identifiers of the network interfaces followed by MAC
addresses followed by the appropriate number of zeros. All that the Ethernet factor
plane that modularizes TCP/IP from Scott Shenker (Shenker, 2013)
3 At the time this dissertation was written, Linux XIA does not implement the link layer as a
factor.
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on a host would have to do is to encapsulate XIP packets into Ethernet frames and put
them on the wire. Ethernet XIDs could either be used directly in XIP addresses, or
HID XIDs could redirect to Ethernet XIDs using routing redirects and retaining the
same semantics that HID XIDs had in the previous chapters. If Ethernet XID were
used directly in XIP addresses, XIA-aware Ethernet cards could forgo the Ethernet
header and read the XIP header directly. The processing of those frames would follow
regular XIP forwarding: if the LastNode field points to an Ethernet XID, deal with the
packet accordingly, otherwise attempt a lookup on the following edge. Of course, this
hardware modification may not be of interest since Ethernet brings multiple network
stacks to share the same medium, but it emphasizes that a link layer realization can
be seen as a factor.
Beyond the role of modularity that the layer abstraction takes on in many network
architectures, layers establish the order in which packets are passed through protocols.
In XIA, this order is pushed from design time to runtime; every XIP address defines
the order in which factors are invoked. Ultimately, the layer abstraction reflects the
static dependency that exists among the factors in a layered architecture.
The macroscopic view of TCP/IP and XIA from the abstractions that modular-
ize these architectures spotlights the conceptual departure that XIA takes from the
common view of computer networks, and further indicates that we are heading onto
uncharted waters. While the departure from the common view could make the as-
similation of XIA more difficult by the broad community, the fact that we are again
entering uncharted waters is an exciting moment for researchers that have watched
the incremental evolution of TCP/IP for more than 40 years.
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6.3 Conclusions
Believing that the community at large is well-placed to both crowdsource and evaluate
emerging efforts, we have made a consistent effort not to favor any one principal above
another in the implementation of Linux XIA, but to have a level playing field for all
XIA principals. This lack of bias has guided all of our implementation choices, for
example, Linux XIA does not require any principal to be loaded into the kernel,
which leaves principal selection entirely to stakeholders. Ultimately, we expect that
the aggregate of utility functions of stakeholders would select and evolve the set of
principals deployed in large scale in an XIA Internet.
Those awaiting the messianic arrival of a clean-slate replacement architecture
may wish to consider reining in their expectations. Our view is that a winning
architecture arriving in a single-focus form as TCP/IP did for host abstractions, or
as NDN proposes to do for content, is implausible. As we amass experience with
Linux XIA, we have come across a number of interesting ideas for principals that
would benefit only a small subset of stakeholders. These narrow principals have led
us to the idea that Linux XIA could end up becoming home to a collection of minimal-
form principals (e.g. the LPM principal) that rely on each other to properly work,
and, therefore, maximize value to stakeholders when considered in toto.
Finally, not only do principals add value by themselves, they also increase the
value of other principals. For example, 4ID principals bridge the NDN and Serval
principals to IPv4 networks; similarly, NDN and Serval motivate the use of 4IDs
in the first place. These network effects between principals could turn out to be
the greatest source of value of Linux XIA, since they can even increase the value of
already deployed principals.
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